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Review Essay
The State, the Gentry, and Local Institutions:
The Song Dynasty and Long-Term Trends from Tang to Qing*
Song Chen
Bucknell University
song.chen@bucknell.edu
Cunshe chuantong yu Ming Qing shishen: Shanxi Zezhou xiangtu shehui de zhidu bianqian
村社傳統與明清士紳：山西澤州鄉土社會的制度變遷 (Village Worship Associations and
the Gentry in Ming and Qing Times: Institutional Transformations in the Local Society of
Zezhou, Shanxi). By Du Zhenzhen 杜正貞. Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2007. 348
pp. CNY ¥ 30.00 (paper).
The Destruction of the Medieval Chinese Aristocracy. By Nicolas Tackett. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2014. xiv + 281 pp. $49.95 (hardcover), $25.00
(paper).
Kin Gen jidai no kahoku shakai to kakyo seido: Mō hitotsu no “shijin sō” 金元時代の華北社
会と科挙制度―もう一つの「士人層」(Society and the Examination System in North China
during the Jin-Yuan Period: Another “Literati Stratum”). By Iiyama Tomoyasu 飯山知保.
Tokyo: Waseda daigaku shuppanbu, 2011. xi + 464 pp. JPY ¥ 8,900 (cloth).
The Making of a New Rural Order in South China: I. Village, Land, and Lineage in Huizhou,
900-1600. By Joseph P. McDermott. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. xvi +
466 pp. $102.00, £67.00 (cloth), $34.99, £22.99 (paper), $28.00, £21.60 (ebook).
Negotiated Power: The State, Elites, and Local Governance in Twelfth- to Fourteenth-Century
China. By Sukhee Lee. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2014. xiii + 347
pp. $49.95, £39.95 (cloth).
Historians have long aspired to see beyond the rise and fall of dynasties to the longue durée and
the major changes over time in Chinese society. The five empirically rich and theoretically
sophisticated books discussed in this essay all share this goal. While they make distinct
contributions, they have in common close attention to the relationships between the state, the
elite, and local institutions between the late Tang and Qing periods. Reading them together
encourages rethinking the state-and-society issues that historians have been debating for a
generation. In this essay, after a brief summary of each book’s major contributions, I suggest
ways they help us conceptualize the long-term processes of continuity and change from the Song
to the Qing.
In his book The Destruction of the Medieval Chinese Aristocracy, Nicolas Tackett argues
that the Huang Chao 黃巢 Rebellion (875–84) profoundly changed the nature of the Chinese
*
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political elite by delivering a deadly blow to the great aristocratic families that had, until then,
maintained political influence for six centuries. In a direct challenge to conventional wisdom,
Tackett argues that the aristocracy of the ninth century was, in essence, a “capital elite”
constituted by only a small subgroup of those who claimed aristocratic ancestry—a subgroup
which distinguished itself primarily by its monopoly over government offices, its geographic
concentration in the capital, and its capital-centered marriage networks. Tackett contrasts this
capital elite with a “provincial elite” residing outside the capital region, whose members rarely
held offices or had influence beyond the local arena, despite their claims of descent from great
aristocratic clans (84–87). The political elite’s close ties to the capital were key to its political
prominence, but they also sowed the seeds for the elite’s own demise, making it easy prey during
the bloody massacres and political purges of the closing years of the ninth century (218–27,
233).
For some time it has been widely accepted that the demise of the Tang aristocracy and the
subsequent expansion of the civil service examinations in time fostered the rise of local literati as
a new type of sociopolitical elite, one that provided both leadership in local society and
manpower in the imperial bureaucracy. This narrative, Iiyama Tomoyasu 飯山知保 argues, risks
viewing history as a linear progression and simplifies historical development after the Tang in a
way that unduly privileges the experience of South China. His book Kin Gen jidai no kahoku
shakai to kakyo seido: mō hitotsu no “shijin sō” 金元時代の華北社会と科挙制度―もう一つ
の「士人層」 (Society and the Examination System in North China during the Jin-Yuan Period:
Another “Literati Stratum”) complicates this conventional narrative by telling an alternative
story focusing on the north. First, he problematizes the relationship between Confucian
education, sinicization, and leadership in local society. Although a large number of Jurchens
participated in Confucian education during the Jin, argues Iiyama, they maintained their ethnic
identity and formed a social group distinct from their Han neighbors. Their Confucian education
did not make them more respected leaders of local society, but it did function like a social safety
net that provided some stipends and some chances of gaining office at a time when demographic
expansion and decades of peace deprived many of alternative routes to power and wealth.
Throughout the Jin, “Jurchen Confucian scholars” (Joshin jushi 女真儒士) remained distinct
from the Han local literati (zairai shijin 在來士人). They were integrated into the Chinese
society only after the Mongol conquest destroyed their social organization and hierarchy (146–
47). Likewise, Iiyama argues, the impact of Confucian education on the ethnic and cultural
identity of Mongol garrison families should not be overstated. Only a small number of these
families sent their sons to study in the Directorate of Education or had them participate in the
civil service examinations, and those who did so saw it only as a strategic choice for maintaining
their political status at a time when attaining office through military and clerical service became
difficult (414–15, 426–27).
Even the Chinese literati living under the Jin and Yuan, argues Iiyama, contrasted sharply
with those under the Southern Song. Not only was their population much smaller than in the
Southern Song, but they were also more subordinated to the state. The Jin and Yuan jealously
defended the state’s monopoly of control (ichigenteki na tōchi 一元的な統治) over the literati,
refusing to grant them any fiscal, legal, or social privileges that might help them build up their
own power base in local society, thereby continuing a Chinese political tradition dating back to
the Qin dynasty. It was the Southern Song, weakened by the constant threat from the Jurchens,
that diverged from this tradition, trying to appease local literati by accepting their claims to
various “customary privileges” (kanshūteki na tokken 慣習的な特権, 205) and their leadership
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in local society. The dynamics between state and local society under the Southern Song,
therefore, was qualitatively different (ishitsu 異質) from earlier periods, but it was also this
Southern Song dynamic that was eventually introduced into North China by the Ming state,
which had itself originated from the Jiangnan region. Iiyama’s account of long-term historical
change, therefore, is in line with that of earlier scholars who characterized the Southern Song as
a period when the state was impotent and the literati dominated local society, presaging the statesociety relationship of the Ming-Qing period.
It is this view of the Southern Song with which Sukhee Lee takes issue in Negotiated
Power: The State, Elites, and Local Governance in Twelfth- to Fourteenth-Century China. In
contrast to Iiyama, Lee is more reluctant to give himself over to grand narratives that focus on
the longue durée. In his book Negotiated Power, he presents a lucid account of the state, the
elites, and the roles they played in Mingzhou 明州 (now Ningbo, Zhejiang) during the Southern
Song and Yuan (1271–1368). He stresses continuity, not change, in the elite’s marriage patterns
and their active pursuit of government connections from the Northern Song through the Yuan.
He does point out, however, that the literati and officeholding population of Mingzhou increased
dramatically in the Southern Song and that they also became highly active in asserting their
collective identity and lending their voices to the local administration. But they were not separate
from the state. Lee demonstrates persuasively that the local government in Southern Song
Mingzhou was also far more resourceful and active in promoting local development than
previously imagined, providing both financial and organizational support to a wide range of local
projects, including those first initiated and advocated by the local elites. Local elite activism was
in greater evidence during the Southern Song than earlier, but Lee argues that it was “not the
withdrawal of government, but its presence and cooperation with local elites,” that made that
activism possible (200).
Change, in Lee’s eyes, lay more in each dynasty’s unique visions and institutional
arrangements. Whereas the New Policies advocates during the Northern Song aggressively tried
to impose their own blueprint on local society, the Southern Song state viewed itself “not simply
[as] its ruler,” but “as a participant in and caretaker of local society” (149), more willing to
recognize the legitimacy of private interests and more capable of finding ways to accommodate
them. Always seeking the “mutual convenience of the public and the private” (gongsi liangbian
公私兩便) (141–44), the Southern Song state was always willing to respond to local demands as
they arose.1 The Yuan was as different from the Southern Song as it was from the Northern
Song. It was in the Yuan that the composition of Mingzhou elites changed most dramatically: the
decline of civil service examinations, the growing importance of clerkships, and the expansion of
sea transport challenged the status of the established elite families and created new ones (226). It
was also in the Yuan that financial support from the government for local projects declined
precipitously, while it tied the Song principle of “beneficiary pays”—a principle requiring that
local residents who would benefit from a project contribute to its cost—to hereditary
1

This seems to parallel the contrast between economic reforms of the People’s Republic of China in the
1980s and reforms in the 1990s. Huang Yasheng argues that the reforms of the 1980s were experimental
and gradualist, featuring the relaxation of existing government constraints on the private sector in order to
encourage bottom–up innovations that met indigenous demands, whereas the reforms of the 1990s were
characterized by a government bent on carrying out its own technocratic blueprint of economic
development. Huang Yasheng, Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 85–104.
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occupational household categories and applied it extensively, often leaving local residents
responsible for the entire expenditure for maintaining local infrastructure (242).2 These
differences, in Lee’s eyes, were immediate consequences of the unique institutional framework
of the Yuan, and none of them were heralds of long-term trends. In other words, Lee sees history
as the play-out of a dialectical relationship between continuity and the impact of each dynasty’s
unique institutional choices (18). For him, every dynasty is a bridge between the preceding and
the following periods, but what it inherits and transmits is more complex than any claims of
secular trends can adequately capture and always bears the imprint of the dynasty’s distinct
visions and policies (272).
In the fourth book under discussion, Joseph P. McDermott gives far more weight to longterm social and economic factors in explaining historical change. In his book The Making of a
New Rural Order in South China: I. Village, Land, and Lineage in Huizhou, 900–1600, the first
of two planned volumes on the social and economic history of Huizhou 徽州 from the Song to
the Ming, McDermott crafts a rich narrative of how trust-based lineages came to dominate
economic and political resources in the countryside of this important prefecture. In line with the
large body of scholarship on lineage development in Fujian and Guangdong, McDermott
demonstrates that the earliest Huizhou lineages grew out of the immediate social and political
contexts of the early Ming. He shows that local families drew upon widely shared ideas about
kinship to organize themselves for the purpose of perpetuating themselves as the natural leaders
of their area (235) and fulfilling their military and fiscal obligations to the Ming state (242).
Moreover, since Buddhist temples in the early Ming had lost their tax-exempt status (87–89) and
were struggling to protect their landholdings from a hostile government (215), lineages not only
claimed cultural authority in the state-sponsored Neo-Confucian discourse but also appealed to
the rich and powerful as an alternative arrangement for sheltering landholdings and evading
taxes.3 McDermott’s book makes a major contribution to this body of scholarship by balancing
the attention to immediate institutional contexts and the social and political processes of the early
2

Lee traces the “beneficiary pays” principle to the Southern Song. As far as my reading goes, it seems to
have become an established practice precisely during the New Policies period. In the edict of 1069
announcing Wang Anshi’s new policy on land development and irrigation (nongtian shuili fa 農田水利
法), households which would benefit from land reclamation and irrigation projects (shouli renhu 受利人
戶) were considered first in line to pay for the expenses, and those short of funds for large-scale projects
were expected to “take loans” from the government and wealthy locals. It described the role of
government in terms of “regulating” (yueshu 約束) and “organizing” (jiushuai 糾率) when private funds
were sufficient, providing financial assistance through loans (bohua jiadai, zhuqi quefa 擘畫假貸，助其
闕乏) when private funds were not, managing the funds, and supervising the progress. The same edict
also required the circuit intendancies and the prefectural government to coordinate large-scale projects
that crossed administrative borders. Cooperation between the different levels of local government and
between the government and local elites surfaces repeatedly in late Northern Song and Southern Song
sources. Xu Song 徐松, Song huiyao 宋會要輯稿 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1957), “Shihuo” 1.27b–28a.
The only possible reference to the “beneficiary pays” principle I have seen before the New Policies period
was in a memorial from a judiciary intendent of Liangzhe in 1045, which proposed that local officials
“persuade and induce” (quanyou 勸誘) households which would “benefit from the [increased] rents” (zuli
renhu 租利人戶) to fund local irrigation projects on a voluntary basis. See Xu Song, Song huiyao jigao,
“Shihuo” 7.12b.
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Ming with emphasis on longue-durée factors. He argues that the rise of trust-based lineages was
also the result of a successful organizational innovation spurred by long-term economic changes
and managerial challenges. The dominant type of large kinship organization until Song times had
been the large communal family, which valued “equality and harmony rather than efficiency and
productivity” and “paid as much attention to the retention of labor as to the extension of the
arable” (114–16). Population growth and resource shortage in Song times rendered this model
inadvisable, and Fan Zhongyan’s 范仲淹 (989-1052) idea of establishing a lineage trust was,
therefore, a response to the new social and economic conditions. By setting up a corporate estate
separate from the private property of individual members of the kinship group and by focusing
more on resource management than labor control, Fan’s plan provided a loose but fitting
framework for his times. Although its organizational structures and practices continued to evolve
in subsequent centuries in order to meet the persistent challenges of resource management and
membership governance, Fan’s plan became the preferred model of large kinship organization in
South China from the late twelfth century onward (114–15, 118). Such organizations emerged in
large numbers in the early Ming. By the mid-sixteenth century, lineages grew into the dominant
village institution in Huizhou and then fell under the sway of an office- or degree-holding gentry,
constituting what McDermott calls “a new rural order.”
The Making of a New Rural Order in South China transcends the age-old paradigm that
focuses on the triangular relationship between the state, the gentry, and local society and, like
many scholars of the South China school, pays due attention to the development of local
institutions. Instead of viewing local institutions as merely a tool of the gentry to solidify their
position in local society, it treats the lineage as an independent agent in local history with its own
logic of operation, plagued by internal tensions and embedded in a complicated and dynamic
relationship with other local forces. Du Zhengzhen’s 杜正貞 book Cunshe chuantong yu Ming
Qing shishen 村社傳統與明清士紳 (Village Worship Associations and the Gentry in Ming and
Qing Times) takes a similar approach to understanding the evolution of local society in Zezhou
澤州, southern Shanxi, from the Song to the Qing. The gentry and rural organizations constituted
two types of authority in local society—“personal authority” (geren quanwei 個人權威) and
“institutional authority” (zhidu quanwei 制度權威)—and had a more “complicated and
dynamic” relationship with each other than had been previously recognized. It was their
“cooperation and competition and the waxing and waning of their relative strength,” Du argues,
“that provided one of the agents for change in the power structure of local society” (269). Unlike
in Huizhou and South China in general, trust-based lineages never grew into a dominant
institution in Zezhou, despite sporadic gentry efforts to promote them. Instead, the principal form
of local organization was the village worship association (cunshe 村社), which first appeared in
the Northern Song.4 Du attributes the formation of these village worship associations to a twopronged Song strategy of local control that involved extending imperial recognition to local
deities, on the one hand, and building an effective rural administrative apparatus, on the other.
The effects of these policies were “directly reflected” in the new forms of religious life and
4

The urban and rural formed a continuum in later imperial China and one could easily transform to the
other depending on the ebb and flow of local commercial activity. When commercial growth created new
market towns in the countryside—as was the case in Guoyu, discussed below—the village worship
association was typically carried over as a form of local organization in the new urban neighborhood. I
use “village worship association” here as a general term for this type of social organization in both rural
and urban contexts for convenience and consistency with McDermott’s translation of the she.
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social organization in the countryside. Buddhist influences waned, and worship of rain gods
began to center on idols sheltered in shrines (280). This change in religious practice brought
about a parallel change in the way rural communities were organized. As they pooled resources
to construct a common shrine as the site of collective worship, villages entered into an alliance
bound by not only geographical proximity but also common religious activities. When these
multi-village alliances were first formed, Du argues, their boundaries seem to have been defined
by the guan 管, an early Northern Song tax-collecting unit in the countryside. Each multi-village
alliance was coextensive with a guan and named itself after the guan. But once there, the multivillage alliance took on a life of its own and continued to define a supra-village rural community
centered on its common shrine for many centuries after the guan was abolished as a functional
rural administrative unit. This, in turn, strengthened the village-level worship associations (she
社), in the form of which each village joined the alliance, so much so that the Jin and Yuan
dynasties adopted the village worship association as their basic unit of rural administration (52–
56). Du contends that the tenacity of these new forms of rural organizations—village worship
associations and multi-village alliances—was so remarkable that in the following centuries they
weathered not only wars and significant changes in the composition of the local population but
also the Ming dynasty’s attempt to remold them.
For Du, historical change had an origin but was also cumulative. “The emergence of a
human settlement is always associated with the birth of a set of local social institutions.
Institutional change thenceforth was an ongoing process of accumulation, superposition,
transmission, and modification” (279). The village worship association, too, continued to evolve
after the Song. And like lineages in South China, its evolution was shaped more by local needs
than imperial directives. Du identifies the former half of the Qing as a major moment of change
in the history of village worship associations. Over the course of the Ming, economic and
cultural developments created new social divisions and deepened existing ones in Zezhou. The
growth of commerce and local industry, mainly iron-working and coal-mining, gave rise to a
powerful merchant class. Wealth, through investment in education, translated into examination
success and gentry status. Although literati culture began to take off in Zezhou in the Jin and
Yuan, it was only during the 150 years between the Wanli (1573–1620) and Kangxi (1662–1722)
reigns that Zezhou men had their day in the civil service examinations (94). The commercial and
industrial development also created new towns and a sizable urban population, which
complicated the distribution of taxes between townspeople and landowning rural households. It
also brought about an influx of immigrants lured by promising job opportunities. The tensions
between the gentry and the merchants, villagers and town-dwellers, the rich and the poor, and
locals and new immigrants became a vexing problem in some places of Zezhou, only to be
exacerbated by the absence of an effective mechanism for promoting social integration (132–45).
By the early Qing, the village or town worship association gradually evolved into an institutional
space for cooperation and negotiation between diverse interest groups in the local community.
Prompted by the need for local defense in the midst of late Ming chaos, many village worship
associations transcended their traditional roles in the religious realm and took on a broader range
of public responsibilities. Their authority and sphere of activity continued to expand in the first
half of the Qing, gradually evolving into a self-governing institution in rural society. As the
official apparatus of rural control and resource extraction hollowed out over the course of the
Qing and the influence of the gentry declined after the mid-eighteenth century as a result of poor
examination performance, village worship associations expanded to meet the local needs for a
public authority that could provide community services, enforce social regulation, organize
6

economic activities, and ease the process of fulfilling the taxpaying households’ fiscal
obligations to the state (214, 217–22).
These five books have many features in common. They all take a longue-durée
perspective. They all seek to understand how the relationship between the state, the elite, and
local society evolved over time. Above all, they all point, in one way or another, to the Song
dynasty as a watershed. Tackett implies that the Song ushered in a new age, being the first major
dynasty after the demise of the “medieval Chinese aristocracy.” Iiyama argues that it was the
Southern Song that first diverged from China’s millennium-old political traditions by
acknowledging the literati’s leadership in local society and thereby initiating a new dynamic
between state and society that was inherited by the Ming-Qing period. For McDermott, the Song
was a period when the economy finally developed to the point that made the large communal
family an unappealing model of large kinship organization, thus giving rise to an institutional
innovation—the corporate, or trust-based, lineage—that eventually became the dominant village
institution in the South China countryside a few centuries later. In Du’s study, the dominant form
of rural organization was the village worship association, which, too, had its origin in the
Northern Song policies of rural administration and the new forms of religious life. Yet both
McDermott and Du also stress the continuous evolution of these institutions in Ming and Qing
times. Lee is perhaps the most cautious. Lee points out that it was in the Southern Song that the
state ceased to impose its own vision on local society, but instead sought cooperation with the
local elite, which now included a quickly expanding and increasingly assertive literati
population. He nevertheless stresses the uniqueness of each dynasty and seems hesitant to attach
any greater importance to the changes he observes in the Song than those in other periods.
The five books raise several related questions: How should we understand continuity and
change in Chinese history? Was there a pattern or trend, and what position did the Song have in
it? To put it in a slightly different way, did changes that transpired in the Song signal a major
divide between two distinctive historical periods, or were they nothing special since—as it was
for Heraclitus—all was flux?
The “Localist Turn” and the Rise of the Gentry
The view of the Song as a turning point in history has an intellectual lineage that goes back to
Naitō Konan 內藤湖南 (1866–1934). In his view, the Song marked the beginning of the rise of
imperial autocracy, a trend which culminated in the Ming-Qing period. Following the demise of
the aristocracy during the late Tang and the Five Dynasties, he argued, the principle of
bureaucratic recruitment shifted from “an independent birthright” beyond the emperor’s control
to “a conditional appointment by imperial will.” Whereas the Tang emperor was only a
representative of the aristocracy whose power was constrained by aristocratic interests, the
emperor from the Song onward exercised absolute power over his officials, whom he himself
recruited from the commoners through civil service examinations. Naitō pointed out
emphatically the many changes in formal governmental organizations and the dynamics of court
politics that led to an “increasing arrogation of state functions in the emperor’s hands and a
corresponding elevation of his ritual status.”5
5
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Naitō Torajirō 內藤虎次郎, “Gaikakuteki Tō-Sō jidaikan” 概括的唐宋時代觀, Rekishi to chiri 歴史と
地理 9.5 (1922), 1–12.
7

In the 1980s, social historians proposed a competing view. They shifted attention from
politics and institutions to the behavioral patterns of the elite and from distribution of power
within the government to the relationship between state and local society. The most important
proponents of this view include Robert M. Hartwell and his student Robert P. Hymes. In his
pioneering article “Demographic, Political, and Social Transformations of China, 750–1550,”
Hartwell gave less weight to changes between the Tang and Song than between the two halves of
the Song dynasty itself.6 He described the change as “the demise of a semi-hereditary
professional bureaucratic elite… [in the early twelfth century] and its replacement… by a
multitude of local elite gentry families.” Whereas the local elite based its power in local society
and “viewed a bureaucratic career as only one of a variety of occupational choices,” the
professional elite, argued Hartwell, specialized in government service and perpetuated itself in
high offices over multiple generations.7 Hartwell defined the professional elite by its distinctive
social behavior, which in many ways resembles that of the ninth-century Tang elite in Tackett’s
study: its members claimed descent from the great aristocratic clans, established their main
residence in the capital region, intermarried with each other regardless of regional origin, and
served in high offices generation after generation. It should be noted, however, that the
professional elite identified by Hartwell was composed of a fairly limited number of families in
the Song which dominated, but did not monopolize, the Song government. Although it provided
a “disproportionate number of incumbents” to high offices in the Song government, it never
monopolized government offices to the extent that the ninth-century elite did. At all times and at
all levels of government, it shared political power with men from local elite families. Even at the
peak of its power, for example, it claimed less than one-third of policy-making offices while the
local elite families always staffed at least half of these positions.8
Hartwell’s study broke new ground by defining the ruling elite as much by its social
behavior as by its claims of ancestry. It is his student, Robert P. Hymes, who applied this
approach fully. In an influential study published four years later, Hymes shifts attention from
incumbents of national offices to those men and women who had privileged “access to wealth,
power, and prestige… in the local scheme of things” in Fuzhou 撫州, Jiangxi, and combines
prosopographical research on their residence and marriage patterns with close analyses of their
activities in local society.9 He notes that the social behavior associated with the professional
elite—capital residence, intermarriage with each other regardless of regional origin, and selfperpetuation in government—was characteristic of a much larger number of families than
Hartwell had realized, including many from Fuzhou whom Hartwell would have categorized as
the “local elite gentry families.” This behavior disappeared, however, in the Southern Song.
Therefore, Hymes argues, the transition in the early twelfth century should be best described not
as the demise of a specific status group but, instead, the abandonment of one strategy in favor of
another. Whereas local elite families in the Northern Song pursued a “national” or “bureaucratic”
strategy centered on the attainment of high office, elite families in Southern Song Fuzhou
followed a “localist” strategy that concentrated on consolidating their local power base and
6
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sought only occasional office as one element of perpetuating their local status. Hymes’s evidence
comes, like that of Hartwell, from their subjects’ contrasting decisions on residence and
marriage. In pursuit of high office, Fuzhou men in the Northern Song who succeeded in the
examinations and received an appointment in government usually migrated from Fuzhou to
major economic and political centers and contracted “long-distance” marriages with families
from other counties and prefectures. Only those who had not yet achieved office stayed in
Fuzhou, but they too, Hymes suspects, shared the same ultimate goal of rising to political
prominence and their efforts at home—accumulating wealth and building connections—was the
first step in that direction.10 This all changed in the Southern Song. Elite families in Southern
Song Fuzhou focused more on consolidating their status at home than on rising high in
government. Not a single prominent family left Fuzhou after 1127. They sought affines almost
exclusively from Fuzhou itself and, most often, from just within their home counties. They
engaged actively in organizing local defense, developing infrastructure, promoting local welfare,
and constructing local cultural spaces. They developed a strong local consciousness, employing
history-writing to carve out an identity for their home locales and for themselves as local men.
The Southern Song, therefore, saw “the growing importance of1ocality in elite social life and
self-conceptions” and the separation of elite from state.11
Sukhee Lee questions this argument. His study reveals remarkable continuity, not change,
in the patterns of elite marriage between the two halves of the Song. He contends that elite
families in both Northern and Southern Song Mingzhou arranged a mix of local and non-local
marriages. In both periods, Lee shows, approximately half of the elite marriages were between
families from the same county while a third were across prefectural borders (64–65). In a review
of Hymes’s evidence, he points out further that the high incidence of localized marriages in
Fuzhou reflects, at best, the tendency in the last decades of the Southern Song or, at worst,
perhaps a bias in the sources we have for those years (80–82). These findings are consistent with
earlier studies on elite marriage inspired by Hymes. Beverly J. Bossler’s study on grand
councilor families and the Wuzhou 婺州 (now Jinhua, Zhejiang) elite, for example, also reveals
more continuity than change between the two halves of the Song, leading her to argue that that
the geography of marriage was primarily a function of political status, with higher-ranking
officials in both periods more likely to have affines from outside their home counties and
prefectures than their lower-ranking colleagues. The relatively higher incidence of local marriage
in Southern Song Wuzhou was almost certainly the result of more marriages of commoners
being documented in this period. She also stresses the strong preference in both periods for
finding affines nearby, noting that grand councilor families in the Northern Song who contracted
marriages with each other, in fact, lived mostly in the capital region and that Wuzhou elite
families who went beyond prefectural borders for in-laws usually married southerners from nottoo-distant regions.13 The apparent contrast between Northern and Southern Song geography of
marriage, therefore, was a product of confusion of ancestral homes with places of actual
residence and historiographical biases. Likewise, in a study of southern Fujian, Hugh Clark
10

Hymes, Statesmen and Gentlemen, 119–20.
Peter K. Bol, “The ‘Localist Turn’ and ‘Local Identity’ in Later Imperial China,” Late Imperial China
24.2 (2003), 1–50. Peter K. Bol, “The Rise of Local History: History, Geography, and Culture in
Southern Song and Yuan Wuzhou,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 61.1 (2001), 37–76.
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Beverly Bossler, Powerful Relations: Kinship, Status, and the State in Sung China (960–1279)
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 1998), 164–65.
11

9

argues that marriage was “at all times first and foremost a local affair,” though elites in both the
Northern and Southern Song also regularly had affines from outside their home prefectures.14
We should exercise caution, however, before rejecting the “localist turn” paradigm too
quickly. Read against Tackett’s book on the Tang political elite, Lee’s study on Mingzhou brings
to the fore the dramatic change between the late Tang and the Southern Song. As late as the
waning decades of the Tang, offices at all levels of government continued to be monopolized by
a capital elite. Political prominence was so closely related to capital residence that relocation to
the provinces was nothing short of a death knell for a family’s political future. This contrasts
starkly with the Southern Song. For Mingzhou men in the Southern Song, living outside the
capital was no obstacle to political success. Many local families, like the Lous 樓 and Shis 史,
rose to national eminence and perpetuated their status until the end of the Song. Rather than
discrediting the “localist turn” paradigm, Lee’s study, I think, challenges us to reconsider and
better articulate what it meant, when and why it happened, and what the implications were.
First of all, underlying this persistent scholarly interest in the geography of marriage is
the assumption we have inherited from Hartwell that the choice of affines, along with decisions
on migration, gives a clue to understanding the character of the ruling elite—whether it
constituted a distinct, self-perpetuating status group separate from the layer of wealthy, powerful
families which assumed leadership in local society—and how it maintained its political status.
To take this assumption seriously means that whether or not families without official rank
married locally, therefore, is irrelevant.15 It also means that marriage patterns of the
officeholding elite must be interpreted in tandem with other aspects of its social behavior (such
as its residence patterns) as a measure of its social distinctiveness and the degree of its
attachment to local communities whence they hailed. Second, as social historians looking for
long-term trends often remind us, major institutional changes in history, not to mention social
and economic changes, do not always coincide with the rise and fall of dynasties, and relying on
major dynastic markers—such as the founding of the Northern Song in 960 and the Jurchen
conquest of 1127—to define our unit of analysis runs the risk of obscuring important changes.
Once we are more precise on defining periods of comparison, focus exclusively on the
officeholding elite, interpret its choice of affines alongside its patterns of residence, all evidence
points to the mid-eleventh century—not the late Tang or the end of the Northern Song—as a
major watershed in history.
Relocation to the capital and the Grand Canal region (an economic hub that provided
convenient access to the capital) was a popular choice for many who became officials very early
14

Hugh Clark, Portrait of a Community: Society, Culture, and the Structures of Kinship in the Mulan
River Valley (Fujian) from the Late Tang through the Song (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press,
2007), 165.
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In fact, all scholars agree that non-officeholding families had little choice but to marry locally. Bossler,
Powerful Relations, 165; Hymes, Statesmen and Gentlemen, 120. Likewise, marriages arranged by
families before they produced officials were more likely to be local than after they acquired their official
status. Lee’s study shows that even the famed Shis married locally in the Northern Song prior to their
political ascendancy. Lee, Negotiated Power, 65; Song Chen, “Bunken tōchika ni okeru zaichi shakai to
kōiki chihō: Sōdai Shisen o chūshin toshite” 分権統治下における在地社会と広域地方－宋代四川を
中心として－, in Chūgoku Sōdai no chiiki zō: hikakushi kara mita sensei kokka to chiiki 中国宋代の地
域像－比較史からみた専制国家と地域, edited by Ihara Hiroshi 伊原弘, et al. (Tokyo: Iwata-shoin,
2013), 159–61.
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in the Song dynasty, not just those who rose to high ranks, but it began to lose its appeal around
the middle of the eleventh century. All six emigrant families from Fuzhou identified by Hymes,
for example, produced their first metropolitan degree holder (jinshi) by 1015. These six families,
plus the Xus 胥, of whom we know little, accounted for the vast majority of degree holders from
Fuzhou before 1040. Four of them established new gravesites in the vicinity of the capital or
along the Grand Canal by the early eleventh century, almost immediately following their
examination success.16 By contrast, while a far greater number of Fuzhou men from a much
larger pool of local families passed the examinations between 1040 and 1127, there is no
evidence that any of these newly successful individuals, except Cai Chengxi 蔡承禧, relocated
from their home prefecture.17 Wuzhou and Mingzhou records reveal a similar trend. Hu Ze 胡則
(963–1039), jinshi of 989 (and, in fact, the only degree holder of Wuzhou before 1040 for whom
detailed biographical data survives), established a residence in Kaifeng shortly after receiving his
degree and moved to Hangzhou at the southern end of the Grand Canal upon retirement.18
Wuzhou began to produce jinshi with considerable regularity after 1040, but judging from late
16

Hymes, Statesmen and Gentlemen, 310–12. These four include the Yues 樂, the Yans 晏, two branches
of the Wangs 王, and one branch of the Wus 吳. Yan Shu 晏殊 (991–1055) passed the examinations in
1005 and was buried in Xuzhou 許州. Wang Guanzhi 王貫之 (967–1028) obtained the jinshi degree in
1000 and was initially buried in Hezhou 和州. His grave was later moved to neighboring Zhenzhou 真
州, closer to the Grand Canal, following the death of his widow. Wang Yongzhi 用之, brother of Guanzhi
and grandfather of Wang Anshi, did not obtain official ranks and stayed in Fuzhou. But Yongzhi’s son Yi
益 (993–1038) passed the examinations in 1015 and established a new home in Jiangning 江寧. Yue Shi
樂史 (930–1007) passed the examinations in 980. No evidence of his burial site survives, but the family
moved to Luoyang by at least his son’s generation before 1039. See Wang Anshi, Linchuan xiansheng
wenji 臨川先生文集 (Sibu congkan edition), 99.9b (寧國縣太君樂氏墓誌銘), also included in Quan
Song wen 全宋文 (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2007), 65:1419.234. Yin Zhu 尹洙, Henan
xiansheng wenji 河南先生文集 (Sibu congkan edition), 15.6b–7a (故夫人黃氏墓誌銘, also in Quan
Song wen, 28:589.89). Wu Min 吳敏 passed the examinations in 992. One of his sons, Wu Ben 吳賁,
entered government service using the yin privilege and moved to Tangzhou 唐州. Another son of Min,
Wu Fan 吳蕃, and his descendants were politically obscure and did not seem to move from Fuzhou until
around 1080. Fan did not obtain any official rank and his son Ze 賾 had only a minor office. Ze’s son,
Que 慤 (1063–1144), however, relocated to Jiangning during the Yuanfeng period (1078–85) to join his
affinal kin, the Wangs, and received an office with Wang Anshi’s posthumous grace. Sun Di 孫覿,
Hongqing jushi wenji 鴻慶居士文集 (Siku quanshu edition), 34.16b–20a (宋故右承議郎吳公墓誌銘,
also in Quan Song wen, 161:3488.8).
Of the remaining two emigrant families, The Zengs 曾 made a uniquely heroic effort to maintain
their gravesite in Fuzhou, but their primary geographic attachment seems to have long been elsewhere.
The family produced their first Song official when Zeng Zhiyao 曾致堯 (947–1012) passed the
examinations in 983. And since 975 every generation of the Zengs married regularly with families living
in the capital region or along the Grand Canal. Although Zeng Zhao 曾肇 (1047–1107) insisted on being
carried back to Fuzhou for burial, he and his brother Bu 布 (1036–1107) maintained their main residence
in Runzhou 潤州. Only the Cais 蔡 seem to be an exception, relocating from Fuzhou only after Chengxi
承禧 (1035–1084) passed the examinations in 1057.
17
Fuzhou fuzhi 撫州府志 (1876 edition, reprinted in Zhongguo fangzhi congshu), 42.1a–8b.
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Northern and early Southern Song sources, nobody but the famous general Zong Ze 宗澤 (1059–
1128) seems to have moved out.19 Unfortunately, Sukhee Lee provides no account of elite
migration in his book. But as far as my own reading goes, elite families in Mingzhou made
similar decisions on residence. All three families—the Wangs 王, the Ges 葛, and the Shens 沈
—who relocated from Mingzhou entered office before 1030.20 By contrast, there is no evidence
that any of the Mingzhou men who passed the examinations after 1040 abandoned their ancestral
homes.21 In Sichuan, too, nearly all those who relocated to the capital and the Grand Canal
region entered civil service before 1040, while all but one of the officials who received the jinshi
19

Bossler, Powerful Relations, 132.
Wang Wenliang 王文亮, who held a prefectural office in Wuyue, submitted to Song rule and was
buried in Jiangling by his son Zhou many years after his death in 1051. His grandson Guai 夬 was
officially registered (guan 貫) as a Hezhou 和州 resident in the examination list of 1070. Wang Anshi,
Linchuan xiansheng wenji, 95.7b (贈尚書刑部侍郎王公墓誌銘 [王文亮], also in Quan Song wen,
65:1416.179). Baoqing Siming zhi 寶慶四明志 (1227, reprinted in Song Yuan fangzhi congkan 宋元方志
叢刊 [Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990]), 10.3a. The Ges 葛 moved most frequently in the first two
generations under the Song. Ge Yuan 葛源 (983–1054) was born in Chuzhou 處州 and moved to
Mingzhou. He passed the examinations in 1012 and was buried in Runzhou. His son Liangsi 良嗣 (1013–
65) was also buried there, despite his official registration as a Kaifeng resident in the examination list of
1051. Wang Anshi, Linchuan xiansheng wenji, 96.12a (度支郎中葛公墓誌銘 [葛源], also in Quan Song
wen, 65:1417.197); 92.11a (葛興祖墓誌銘 [葛良嗣], also in Quan Song wen, 65:1413.145); Baoqing
Siming zhi, 10.1b–2b. Shen Jian 沈兼 (974–1046) made five unsuccessful attempts at the examinations
and was rewarded with a degree only in 1024 at the age of fifty. His last office was in Suzhou 蘇州,
where his son maintained a residence and a gravesite. Wang Anshi, Linchuan xiansheng wenji, 92.8a (太
子中舍沈君墓誌銘 [沈兼], also in Quan Song wen, 65:1413.142); Qiandao Siming tujing 乾道四明圖經
(1169, reprinted in Song Yuan fangzhi congkan), 12.4982; Shen Kua 沈括, Changxing ji 長興集 (Sibu
congkan edition), 30.6b (故天章閣待制沈興宗墓誌銘 [沈起], also in Quan Song wen, 78:1696.51). His
son Qi 起 passed the examinations in 1042. Baoqing Siming zhi, 10.2a.
21
Feng Ji 豐稷 (1033–1107), jinshi of 1059, for example, was buried in his native county in Mingzhou.
Chen Guan 陳瓘, Feng qingmin gong yishu 豐清敏公遺書 (Siming congshu 四明叢書 edition), fulu 附
錄.3a (宋禮部尚書敘復朝請郎提舉亳州太清宮豐公墓誌). The Zhous 周 produced their first jinshi in
the Qingli reign period (1041–48). The success was continued in the next generation with the examination
success of Chuhou 處厚 and Shihou 周師厚, jinshi of 1046 and 1053 respectively. Little is known of
Chuhou, but Shihou continued to maintain his home in Mingzhou and was buried there. His descendants
continue to show up in local sources well into the mid-thirteenth century. His widow died in her private
residence in Mingzhou in 1109 and was buried in her husband’s gravesite there. Zou Hao 鄒浩, Daoxiang
ji 道鄉集 (SKQS edition), 37.13b (高平縣太君范氏墓誌銘 [范仲温女、周師厚妻], also in Quan Song
wen, 132:2847.73); Baoqing Siming zhi, 10.2b; Lou Yue 樓鑰, Gong kui ji 攻媿集 (Sibu congkan
edition), 109.1a (周伯範墓誌銘[周模]). The last Zhou man to appear in the examination list of the local
gazetteer was Zhou Tan 周坦, jinshi of 1250, a fifth-generation descendant of Shihou. Baoqing Siming
zhi, 10.20b. Zhou Zhu 周銖, one of two Shihou’s sons, was officially registered as a Huzhou 湖州
resident, but there is evidence that he continued to live in Mingzhou after retirement from a very brief
career in government. See Baoqing Siming zhi, 10.4b, and Lou Yue, Gong kui ji, 103.20a (周伯濟墓誌銘
[周楫]).
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between 1060 and 1127 abandoned their homes in Sichuan.22 The same trend is also visible
among men occupying the top positions in the Song government. Beverly Bossler has noted that
grand councilor families found the appeal of Kaifeng declining by the mid-eleventh century. A
total of twenty-eight grand councilors in the Northern Song were raised outside the capital
region. Fifteenth of them came into office before 1050 (indicating that they first obtained an
official rank sometime before 1030 at the latest), of whom all but one relocated to Kaifeng;
thirteen came into office after 1050, of whom only one moved to the capital and two others, by
my own count, migrated to the Grand Canal region.23
The geography of marriage cannot be understood separately from changing patterns of
residence. Choosing an affine from outside one’s native area had different social meanings for a
family which continued to live in its native place and a family which did not. Marriages uniting
families from different native places in the Northern Song often involved emigrant officeholders
on one or both sides, and the actual residences of the two families in a marriage were usually in
close proximity. These marriages, therefore, indicate the emigrants’ weakening ties with their
native places and their effort to integrate into the capital-oriented elite circle they had moved
into. Hymes has observed thirty-nine marriages between families from Fuzhou and those from
outside the prefecture, all but five of which were arranged by the six emigrant families.24 Of
these thirty-four marriages, only five were with families from other Jiangxi prefectures (nos. 3, 4,
26, 30, 35 in Hymes’s list), while at least twenty of them (nos. 5, 6, 8–12, 14, 16–20, 23–25, 28,
29, 31, 33, 36) were with officeholding families who lived in fairly close range of where the
22

Song Chen, “Managing the Territories from Afar: The Imperial State and Elites in Sichuan, 755–1279”
(PhD diss., Harvard University, 2011), 253. Of the nine officials who entered civil service between 1040
and 1059 and relocated from Sichuan, five established their new residences in places other than the
capital and the Grand Canal.
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Bossler, Powerful Relations, 46. Of the three grand councilors who came into office after 1050 and
decided to relocate from their native places, two of them, again, received their jinshi degree before 1030,
and the third (Zeng Bu) in 1057. Bossler does not specify whom the grand councilor was that came into
office after 1050 and moved to the Kaifeng area. She seems to refer to Zeng Gongliang 曾公亮 (999–
1078), nominally from Fujian but buried in Xinzheng 新鄭 county of Kaifeng. I suspect, however, that
the family may have established this gravesite in an earlier generation. Gongliang’s grandfather served
the Min state and submitted to the Song rule. His father ranked second in the examinations in 989 and
served in court offices. At the very least, Gongliang’s brother Gongwang 公望 (1010–1066) had been
buried in Xinzheng county before Gongliang’s death. Zeng Zhao 曾肇, “Zeng taishi Gongliang
xingzhuang”曾太師公亮行狀, in Mingchen beizhuan wanyan zhi ji 名臣碑傳琬琰之集, edited by Du
Dagui 杜大珪 (Siku quanshu edition), 52.1a; also in Quan Song wen, 110:2382.99; Qiang Zhi 強至, Cibu
ji 祠部集 (Siku quanshu edition), 35.9b (朝奉郎守尚書虞部郎中上輕車都尉賜緋魚袋曾府君墓誌銘
[曾公望], also in Quan Song wen, 67:1455.176). Besides, Pang Ji 龐籍 (988–1063), appointed grand
councilor in 1051 and buried in Kaifeng, may be another case of relocation to Kaifeng. But he hailed from
a place (Shanzhou 單州) already very close to the capital. Wang Gui 王珪, Huayang ji 華陽集 (SKQS
edition), 48.1a (推誠保德翊戴功臣開府儀同三司太子太保致仕上柱國潁國公食邑八千四百户食實封
二千一百户贈司空兼侍中龐公神道碑銘 [龐籍], also in Quan Song wen, 53:1155.205). The two grand
councilors who moved to the Grand Canal region were Chen Shengzhi 陳升之 (1011–79) of Fujian and
Zeng Bu of Jiangxi, both of whom moved to Runzhou. Zeng Gongliang received his jinshi degree in
1024, Pang in 1015, Chen in the Jingyou reign period (1034–38), and Zeng Bu in 1057.
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Fuzhou men had moved (or would have eventually moved). 25 The Wangs and Zengs, for
instance, sought affines predominantly from along the Grand Canal, and the Les and the Yans
from the capital region. Many of these families, such as Wu Anchi 吳安持 of Zhengzhou 鄭州
and the Zhous of Taizhou 泰州, were themselves early Song immigrants to the capital and the
Grand Canal regions. This behavior, therefore, reveals a strong tendency before the mid-eleventh
century for officeholding families of different regional origins to form a distinct status group
centered on the Song capital and Grand Canal regions and separate from native communities of
each individual family. It is a sign of the political elite’s capital orientation and its separation
from the leadership of local society. It reveals a close relationship between political success and
capital-oriented social networks, highly reminiscent of the late Tang elite discussed in Tackett’s
study.
By contrast, Wuzhou and Mingzhou records are notably scarce on the early Song.27
Evidence of elite marriages in both prefectures comes almost exclusively from after the mideleventh century, when most officeholding families—including politically prominent lineages
like the Lous and Shis—decided against relocation. Marriages across prefectural boundaries in
these cases, therefore, took on a different social meaning. They did not weaken the elite’s ties to
25

Hymes, Statement and Gentlemen, 84-86. In both his discussion and Map 7, Hymes reports a notable
number of marriages between Fuzhou emigrants and families who were not from Jiangxi, the capital
region, or the Grand Canal area. But he seems to have been misled by the nominal places of origin
provided in his sources. Wu Anchi (no. 20) was nominally from Fujian, but his grandfather was buried in
Zhengzhou. Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修, Ouyang wenzhonggong ji 歐陽文忠公集 (Sibu congkan edition),
32.5b–10b (資政殿大學士尚書左丞贈吏部尚書正肅吳公墓誌銘 [吳育], also in Quan Song wen,
35:753.349). Lady Chao 晁 (no. 12) was nominally from Kaifeng, but her father Zongke 宗恪 (1007–69)
was buried in Yangzhou 揚州. Zeng Gong 曾鞏, Yuanfeng leigao 元豐類藁, 46.7a (光祿少卿晁公墓誌
銘 [晁宗恪], also in Quan Song wen, 58:1270.276). Lady Su 蘇 (no. 14) was nominally from Meizhou
眉州, Sichuan, but her father Zhe 轍 (1039–1112) relocated to Ruzhou 汝州, bordering Luoyang and
close to Kaifeng, and the marriage was arranged in the capital. Zeng Xie 曾協, Yunzhuang ji 雲莊集,
5.29a–32a (代從兄作伯母事述, also in Quan Song wen, 219:4854.80). Others settled in Jiangxi and its
vicinity. Lady Li (no. 35) was nominally from Fujian, but her grandfather Yin 寅 had moved to
Hongzhou 洪州, Jiangxi, following a brief detention at Kaifeng upon the Song conquest. Wang Anshi,
Linchuan xiansheng wenji, 88.8b (虞部郎中贈衛尉卿李公神道碑 [李虛舟], also in Quan Song wen,
65:1411.102); Tuotuo 脫脫, Song shi 宋史, 300.9973. Zhang Kui 張奎 (no. 22), nominally of Fujian, was
buried in Jiangzhou 江州 at the junction of the Gan River and Yangzi River. Wang Anshi, Linchuan
xiansheng wenji, 99.5b (長安縣太君王氏墓誌 [王益女、張奎妻], also in Quan Song wen,
65:1419.229). No. 30 was a typo: Li Xiuyong 李修永 was from Hongzhou, Jiangxi, not Huangzhou 黃州,
Hubei. Lü Nangong 呂南公, Guanyuan ji 灌園集 (Siku quanshu edition), 19.10a (宋故撫州臨川縣丞李
君墓誌銘 [李亢], also in Quan Song wen, 109:2374.338). In the remaining seven cases (nos. 7, 13, 21,
32, 34, 37, 39), the place of origin given for the affines of Fuzhou emigrants might also be nominal, but
with the exception of Jiang Bao 江褒 (no. 7), there is no information on their actual residence or their
family’s burial site. Jiang Bao 江褒, nominally of Chuzhou 處州, was buried in Huzhou 湖州, close to
the Grand Canal. Cheng Ju 程俱, Beishan ji 北山集 (Sibu congkan edition), 31.3a (承議郎信安江君墓誌
銘 [江褒], also in Quan Song wen, 155:3343.397); Beishan ji, 31.13b (宋奉議郎孺人曾氏墓誌銘 [曾布
女], also in Quan Song wen, 155:3343.405).
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its native places; rather, they strengthened its local position by extending its social networks
beyond its home prefectures. These networks, in fact, centered on the elite’s native places.
Wuzhou people who chose affines from outside the prefecture nevertheless tended to marry
southerners from not-too-distance places (164–65). In the same vein, the vast majority of
marriages in Southern Song and Yuan Mingzhou were within the prefectural borders. Of the
eighty-five marriages in the Southern Song that were not, seventy were inside the two circuits of
Liangzhe 兩浙; of the sixteen such marriages in the Yuan, fourteen were inside Liangzhe (Lee,
281-306, Appendix 2). What Beverly Bossler has aptly observed in the marriage patterns of
grand councilor families, I think, applies to the Song political elite in general, except that the
change already began to surface around the mid-eleventh century, a few decades earlier than the
fall of the Northern Song. In the Northern Song, she says, “the network appears to have had a
single center, a single point of convergence in the capital,” while in the Southern Song “that
center had disappeared, and the network had instead numerous regional nodes.”28
Thus, the elite behavior Lee observes in Mingzhou, for both the Northern and Southern
Song, concerns mostly the period after the “localist turn” had already taken place around the
mid-eleventh century. Read together with Tackett’s book, it actually underscores the dramatic
change between the late Tang and Song: that the political elite ceased to exist as a distinct status
group centered on the capital after the mid-eleventh century but became more embedded in the
local society from which it had come.29 This change seems to have lasting significance. The
close relationship between the officeholding elite and its native places continued to be a
prominent feature of the Ming and Qing.
Why then did the capital lose its appeal? One line of explanation blames power struggles
and the Jurchen invasion for making bureaucratic careers less desirable. Power struggles in the
late eleventh century, it is argued, turned court politics into dangerous waters and added to the
uncertainty of obtaining high office, while constant military threat from the Jurchens after 1125
tightened Song finances and limited its fields of action, making influence over central decisions
“less relevant to an elite family’s day-to-day life.”30 This line of argument faces several
difficulties. It does not explain, for example, why the late Tang elite actively pursued high office
and had impressive success in monopolizing political power and perpetuating its status, despite
the nefarious struggles that plagued the ninth-century court. Neither does it explain why
relocation to the capital seems to have started to lose its appeal, in fact, well before the late
Northern Song factional strife and the fall of the capital. More importantly, if the localist turn
around the mid-eleventh century signals the beginning of a long-term trend that continued into
the Ming-Qing period, it also requires a long-term explanation for why the tide was not reversed
in subsequent dynasties—an explanation that short-term events are not likely to provide.

28

Bossler, Powerful Relations, 93.
Beverly Bossler has made a similar observation in her study of the grand councilors. “Whereas in the
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society and concentrated in the capital,” she argues, “in the Southern Sung that political elite remained
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general. Bossler, Powerful Relations, 94.
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Conversely, the dazzling political success of Southern Song Mingzhou men, like that of
the Shis, lends support to the alternative explanation that by the mid-eleventh century capital
residence and capital-centered networks were no longer as important for achieving political
prominence as they had been in the late Tang. As Bossler observes of the Song grand councilors,
“it was not so much that people had lost interest in office, but that the political and social
advantages once exclusive to the center had become much more widely diffused.”31 The
institution of civil service examinations as the major route to office, the expansion of quotas for
prefectural examination graduates in the south, the flourishing of print culture, and the
proliferation of public and private schools outside the capital in the eleventh century ended the
capital’s monopoly over political opportunity, making it ever more possible to translate wealth
into political status via investment in education. Over time, access to the fruits of economic
prosperity seems to have become more important than access to the capital for achieving political
success.32 Southern examination success certainly made connections increasingly available to
those outside the capital, but probably more decisive was the institution of anonymity in the
examinations and the explicit prohibition of “circulating scrolls” (xingjuan 行卷), which reduced
the importance of having connections.33
The general trend from the ninth century on, therefore, was the expanding scope of
political participation outside the narrow circle of a capital elite, eventually giving rise to an
officeholding elite in local society which attained political prominence while remaining very
much part of their local communities. The civil service examination system played a pivotal role
in this change, and it also had a strong spillover effect. By recruiting a few hundred scholars into
the civil service every three years, it encouraged many more to emulate them, bringing about in
local society a literati population (shi 士) many times larger than the officeholding elite, who
participated in a national culture and prided themselves on their learning. Their status as the shi
was certified through enrollment in government schools and participation in the examinations.34
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These men, with their official rank and educational qualifications, constituted a new stratum of
local elite—the “gentry” (jinshen 縉紳) or “literati-officials” (shidafu 士大夫). Their offices,
degrees, and studentships brought not only social prestige, but also substantial fiscal and legal
privileges.35 These privileges functioned as new markers of social standing in local society which
rivaled the importance of wealth and history of local residence. The Mingzhou literati-official
Lou Yue 樓鑰 (1137–1213), for example, took pride in his hometown for according respect on
the basis of a person’s seniority instead of his official rank. “Good feelings among fellow
residents are so highly valued,” he remarked, “that a man is always ranked on the basis of his
age, be he a commoner or a member of the officeholding gentry” 鄉誼最重, 薦紳韋布, 序必以
齒 (Lee, 151 [translation modified]). This remark invites many possible readings. It implies that
elsewhere, in Lou’s times, official rank probably trumped time-honored local traditions that had
valued seniority. With a slight stretch of the imagination, one may also take it to mean that a
similar effort to give greater weight to official rank than age was likewise attempted in
Mingzhou but successfully resisted in order not to hurt the “good feelings among fellow
residents.” However one reads Lou’s remarks, it is clear that these new markers of social
standing threatened to disrupt age-old practices in deciding the pecking-order distinctions in
local society. The relative importance of different kinds of status markers was probably
constantly contested in local society. One need only compare the organizing principles of the
“Genealogies of Chengdu Clans” (Chengdu shizu pu 成都氏族譜), compiled in the late 1190s,
and a similar composite genealogy of the Huizhou clans compiled in the fourteenth century. The
former lists only local families with unbroken traditions of civil service under the Song, groups
them first by the county where they resided, and then within each group arranges them by the
date when they produced their first official in the Song dynasty (qijia houxian 起家後先).36 The
latter, by contrast, did not limit its coverage to the gentry clans or branches and celebrated the
right of settlement, arranging different clans according to when they settled in the prefecture (ju
suoqian Xin’an chaodai xianhou 據所遷新安朝代先後).37
The rise of the gentry in local society, therefore, was a product of both institutional
choices made by historical actors and long-term structural changes. The examination system was
capitalizing on long-term structural changes, such as economic growth and the spread of printing
technology. These changes, which made education more affordable and accessible outside the
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capital, had been underway for centuries and were beyond the control of political leaders. As an
institutional channel for translating wealth into power, the examination system in the Song did
not grant everyone from everywhere equal access to government service. Instead, it replicated—
if not amplified—regional disparities in economic development in the area of political
participation. It ended the dominance of the capital in the examinations, but replaced it with the
dominance of affluent, culturally ascendant regions, including the Zhejiang-Fujian coast and, to a
lesser extent, the Chengdu basin of Sichuan. In the Song, it was these regions that benefited
immensely from the new opportunities provided by the examination system. For this reason,
Mingzhou was nothing other than typical. As a center of both domestic and overseas trade,
Mingzhou was illustrative of the shift. It produced merely fifteen jinshi between 960 and 1040
but as many as 107 jinshi in the following eighty-seven years of the Northern Song. Its
performance in the Southern Song was even more impressive. With a total of 747 local men
receiving the jinshi degree between 1128 and 1279, it ranked third among all Southern Song
prefectures.38 The experience in less advanced regions, one may imagine, would have been
markedly different. Prefectures in North China, for example, with the exception of Kaifeng,
produced only a tiny number of degree holders during the Northern Song.39 Northern Shanxi,
Iiyama observes, was barely touched by the examination culture and the local literati population
was negligible throughout the Northern Song (41).
The tension between upholding meritocratic principles and enlarging the scope of
political participation fueled debate at the eleventh-century court.40 It was partially and
temporarily resolved, ironically, by the Jurchen occupation of North China in 1127. A perfect
complement to Lee’s study on Mingzhou, Iiyama’s book Kin Gen jidai no kahoku shakai to
kakyo seido examines how local elite and local society evolved in vastly different historical
contexts from the twelfth to the fourteenth century. He begins with the institutions of recruitment
in the Jin and Yuan period, explores their social impacts in North China, and enriches his general
discussion with a few case studies focused on Shanxi. One of Iiyama’s most important
contributions, I think, is to demonstrate how the Jurchen conquest changed the geography of
examination success in the north and fostered the growth of a gentry class in northern society.
Despite Iiyama’s emphasis on how differently literati were treated under the Jin and
Southern Song, continuity between the Northern Song and Jin is also noteworthy. Although the
Jurchens, especially the imperial Wanyan clan, nearly monopolized all high-ranking policymaking offices, it was the Chinese that satisfied the Jin’s staffing needs at the lower levels of
bureaucracy. From the very beginning, the Jin implemented a civil service examination system
modeled on the Song and Liao practices. Over time, the Jin reformed it, expanded it, and relied
on it as the primary route for recruiting Chinese talent into the civil service. Furthermore, since
well-established Kaifeng families had fled south and since the highly competitive southern
literati were now living under a different regime, scholars in many areas of North China actually
stood a greater chance of passing the examinations in Jin times. Thus, Iiyama argues, the scope
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of political participation expanded and classical education spread in North China in Jin times.
This trend, similar to that in South China since the mid-eleventh century, is especially evident if
we compare the first and second halves of the Jin dynasty.
In the first half of the Jin, Zhongdu circuit (now Beijing and its environs) was arguably
the center of literati culture in North China. Until 1189 it seems to have consistently produced
the largest number of graduates in the examinations. However, its success, unlike that of Kaifeng
in the Northern Song, reflects its long-standing cultural legacies more than any advantage
associated with its status as the capital of the Jin (Iiyama, 75).41 It was already the center of
literati culture in Liao times. In the early years of the Jin, the dispersal of literati families in
Kaifeng left no place in North China capable of challenging Zhongdu’s cultural preeminence.
That said, Zhongdu circuit never dominated the examinations to the extent Kaifeng had in
the Northern Song. Even in its heyday during the early Jin, it seems to have claimed no more
than a third of the degree holders.42 Its dominance clearly tapered off by the late twelfth century.
During the latter half of Shizong’s reign (1161–89), the Jin implemented policies highly
reminiscent of the Northern Song. The examination system expanded significantly, and the
government expressed interest in reviving prefectural schools, though these schools restricted
their enrollment to imperial clansmen, relatives of officials, and metropolitan examination
candidates (Iiyama, 85–86).43 Estimates show that of the 10,000 or more degrees awarded in the
entire duration of the Jin, the bulk were given in the latter half of the dynasty.44 It was scholars
from outside Zhongdu circuit who seem to have benefited most from these expansions.
According to the statistics provided by Iiyama, in the 1190s, for the first time in the Jin, Zhongdu
circuit lost its position as the top producer of examination graduates. Between 1190 and 1200
more literati from Hedong South (now southern Shanxi) received the coveted degrees than those
from Zhongdu circuit. In the meantime, the circuits of Hedong North, Hebei West, and Shandong
West (roughly northern Shanxi, western Hebei, and western Shandong today) all closed their gap
with Zhongdu dramatically. The percentage of degree holders from Zhongdu circuit dropped to
15%, and it remained at that level until the end of the dynasty (Iiyama, 74–77).
The result was the appearance of a gentry class across North China in the Jin. As Iiyama
demonstrates, the size of this gentry population, though only one-tenth of that in the Southern
Song, was at least twice—and possibly three or four times—that in the late Northern Song (156–
64). Northern Shanxi was a case in point. Situated on the borders between the Chinese, Khitans,
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and Tanguts, it was best known for its professional military families (jiangjia 將家) since the fall
of the Tang and was barely touched by the examination culture of the Northern Song (114–18).
Shanxi produced a very small number of degree holders under the Northern Song and Liao, and
they came almost exclusively from Taiyuan and places to its south. It was only in the Jin, Iiyama
shows, that classical culture spread to northern Shanxi and literati population there expanded
dramatically (111–16).45 Several literati families emerged during the Jin, including the Lius 劉 of
Hunyuan 渾源 and the Yuans 元 of Xiurong 秀容, both of which boasted a tradition in belleslettres. The Yuans, for example, began as a military family in the Northern Song and produced
their first degree holder in 1157 under the Jin. Thereafter, they continued to take the
examinations and hold civil offices using facilitated degrees or the yin privilege, even though
they did not produce another metropolitan examination graduate until 1221 (110). The Lius were
even more successful, having at least two metropolitan degree holders in each generation from
their initial success in 1124 until the fall of the Jin (118–19).
In both the Song and Jin, it was clearly the examination system that provided the
institutional underpinning for the rise of the gentry in local society. It offered incentives for local
elite families to participate in a national culture, opportunities for them to enter government
service, and state certifications for claiming themselves as a prestigious stratum in local society.
The breakdown of the examination system in the Yuan dynasty, therefore, presented a serious
challenge for the local gentry in both North and South China.
Lee and Iiyama both emphasize notable discontinuity brought on by the Mongol conquest
and closely associated with institutional changes in the Yuan. They show that scholars in the
Yuan period faced an array of obstacles to gaining official rank and maintaining their local
status. Although the Yuan state continued to provide ways for local literati to define themselves
as a social stratum different from the commoners, such as registering themselves as “Confucian
households” (ruhu 儒戶) and enrolling in local government schools, these opportunities were
few and the fiscal and legal privileges associated with such status, if any at all, were very limited
and insecure and often subject to the whims of local officials (Lee, 216; Iiyama, 335). Moreover,
their access to political power also became more restricted than ever before. With classical
education no longer a prerequisite for entering government service in Yuan times, scholars now
had to compete with military talents, financial experts, and men with other types of specialized
expertise, to whom the gate to power had opened wide in the Yuan period. The situation was
exacerbated by the breakdown of the examination system. Though a shortcut to high office later
in the dynasty, the examinations were not revived until 1314 and graduated only a negligible
number of candidates for the rest of the dynasty.46 What added to the difficulty of translating
cultural attainments into political and social status was a new definition of what counted as
cultural attainments. When the examinations were resumed, they tested Neo-Confucian moral
philosophy rather than belles-lettres, the favorite subject for candidates during the Jin and much
of the Southern Song. As the importance of the examinations declined, many scholars began to
take up teaching jobs in local academies, clerical posts in local administrations, and managerial
assignments under the Mongol nobility who had fiefs (ayimaqs) nearby. Promotion to a higher
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rank, though possible, was competitive and uncertain, relying heavily on one’s ability to secure
recommendations from high-ranking officials or Mongol noblemen either at court or in the
provinces (Iiyama, 216–89).47
Very few literati families adapted themselves successfully to these changes. The Duans
段 of Jisuan 稷山 in southern Shanxi, discussed at length by Iiyama, was one of the exceptions.
Having produced one degree holder in the late Northern Song and three others in the Jin, the
Duans continued to attain official rank until the early fourteenth century. Their success owed
mainly to two of their strategic moves. On the one hand, they advisedly shifted their focus of
learning from literary composition to moral philosophy, and on the other hand, by having family
members serve in clerical offices at court, they built up connections in the capital with court
officials like Yan Fu 閻復 (1236–1312), through whose recommendations more family members
enrolled in the Directorate of Education and received bureaucratic appointments (Iiyama, 359–
64).
Most literati families, however, were not so lucky. In Shanxi, Iiyama shows, literati
families that produced degree holders in the Jin almost all disappeared from historical records in
the Yuan times (Iiyama, 351). In Mingzhou, Lee contends, even prominent Southern Song
families, like the Shis and Lous, could not avoid gradual decline, and many struggled to preserve
their elite status by embarking on a wide range of career paths, such as clerks, teachers, and sea
transport managers (Lee, 216–17). The result was a noticeable change in both the makeup and
social character of the officeholding local elite. It was no longer constituted solely by men with a
classical education. Instead, they were joined by those who proved their worth in more practical
fields of activity, such as military service and maritime transport. Among these men with
practical skills, some were born to former literati families, and others, like the Nis 倪 of
Mingzhou, came from more modest backgrounds (Lee, 223–24).
The breakdown of the examination system, as Lee and Iiyama both rightly point out, put
literati and other aspirant local families in a weak position vis-à-vis the government. It deprived
local literati not only of a reliable means of achieving high rank but also of an officially
recognized mechanism of defining their group identity and social status (Lee, 207–8). Since
fiscal and legal privileges were often granted at the discretion of local officials and gaining
political success was ever more dependent on social connections, maintaining an amicable
relationship with local and court officials became all the more important. Thus, ironically, as Lee
points out, the breakdown of the examination system decreased only the supply of, not the
demand for, connections to the state in Yuan times. It turned these connections into “a rare
commodity” for the local elite and intensified their need to reach out actively to local officials,
which is evident in the lavish praise they heaped on the Yuan state and its local agents in a
variety of panegyrics, such as “parting prefaces” (songxing xu 送行序) and “stele in appreciation
for departing officials” (qusi bei 去思碑) (Lee, 258–59, 263).48 They took pride in their
connections with Yuan officials by circulating these panegyrics in their literary collections. In
the way that Iiyama puts it, whatever privileges the Yuan local elite enjoyed were no longer
guaranteed by established institutions and time-honored consensus (kanshūteki 慣習的). For that
reason, the process by which the Yuan local elite gained privileges and established itself as local
leaders was, at the same time, also a process that empowered the Yuan state (Iiyama, 206).
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As notable as they were, these changes should not cloud our vision of the continuity
between the Yuan and earlier times. Despite heavy reliance on personal connections, the
“diversification of paths to government service” (shusshi keiro no takika 出仕経路の多岐化), to
use Iiyama’s phrase, recognized the value of distinctive local traditions which nurtured talents in,
for example, military service (e.g., in Dingxiang 定襄 county of northern Shanxi; Iiyama, 185–
91, 205) and maritime transport (e.g., in Mingzhou; Lee, 222–25). As a result, it offered
opportunities for political participation across the empire without privileging a few affluent and
culturally ascendant regions, an issue which had constantly plagued the Song and was only
partially resolved by political disunity in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The long-term trend
of expanding political opportunities outside capital circles, therefore, continued in Yuan times
and benefited especially those regions which had lacked a strong tradition of classical education
(Iiyama, 198, 205).
Secondly, as in the Song and Jin, the expansion of political opportunities in the Yuan
created a locally embedded, office-holding elite in the provinces, although not all members of
this elite were literati. In fact, government service and local dominance became ever more
entangled in the Yuan period. In Dingxiang, for example, at the beginning of the Mongol
conquest, the appointment of local men to county and prefectural offices meant little more than
an official recognition of whatever dominance these strongmen had already achieved in their
home locales in exchange for their willingness to cooperate with the conquerors (Iiyama, 190–
93). Even after Mongol rule took hold, as time progressed many of those who pursued a career in
the new government continued to be employed near their hometowns as teachers, clerks, officers,
tax collectors, and sea transport supervisors. Even for those who set their eyes on national
prominence, a solid local base was critical. Many started out on their careers locally and first
proved their worthiness to local officials or to Mongol princes enfeoffed nearby. Clerical service
in the central government and networking in the capital were extremely valuable, but these
opportunities were few and highly unpredictable. Even the Duans, Iiyama shows, saw their
carefully constructed capital networks collapse following the death of Yan Fu in 1312.
Thereafter, the Duans failed to produce a single officeholder during the Yuan. Many of those
who did try their luck at the capital often made the trip only after they had gained administrative
experience and built up connections near their homes (Iiyama, 233–34).
With careers in government so unpredictable and so tightly bound to a family’s social
station at home, it is not difficult to understand why many office-holding families in the Yuan,
whether from Shanxi or Mingzhou, seem to have continued to live in their native places instead
of relocating to the capital. Their marriage networks, too, were reminiscent of the Song political
elite after the mid-eleventh century, centered on their hometowns but extending frequently to
nearby counties and prefectures (Iiyama, 192–94; Lee 226–32). The Yuan political practice, in
other words, seems to have carried on the long-term trend that began in the Song period: the
expansion of political opportunities outside the capital and the attendant rise of a local elite that
claimed an exalted social standing on the basis of its connections to the state. The diversification
of paths to office in the Yuan times, in fact, gave this elite a more widespread presence across the
empire rather than limiting it to only a few culturally ascendant areas like Song dynasty
Mingzhou.
This is evidently a major reason that deterred the first few Ming emperors from fully
reviving the examination system. Reintroducing southern scholars into the civil service
examinations under a unified empire would almost certainly force northern literati out of the
jinshi ranks and consequently narrow the scope of political participation to an extent unseen in
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two hundred years. The metropolitan examination of 1397 attests to this. Initially, all fifty-one
graduates for that year were southern literati. The emperor was outraged, and his desire to ensure
a balanced representation of different regions in his government was evident in his decision to
reissue the roll of jinshi degree holders with sixty-one new graduates, all northerners. Only after
1450, when an acceptable regional quota system had been put into place, did civil service
examinations become the chief route to office.49 A wider geographical scope of political
participation was also realized, to a limited degree, by allowing provincial examination graduates
(juren 舉人) to hold office. Thus, although the rise of the gentry—locally rooted literati families
who had official titles, examination degrees, or student status in local government schools—
began in Song times, it was not until the mid-fifteenth century that it extended beyond a few
culturally ascendant prefectures. The dramatic increase of metropolitan and provincial degree
holders after 1440 that McDermott documents, both in the Shanhe Chengs’ descent group and in
Huizhou at large, is also evidence of this change (McDermott, 260–61).50
Government and Local Elite Activism in the Song and Yuan
The “localist turn” in the Song period marked the onset of the secular rise of a gentry class in
local society. Already in the Song, this was accompanied by the gentry’s aggressive moves to
affirm a collective identity and expand their role in local governance. They did so by promoting
new institutions and practices and repurposing existing ones. In Southern Song Mingzhou, for
example, the gentry revived and actively promoted the community drinking ceremony (xiang
yinjiu li 鄉飲酒禮) and, by limiting its attendees to “local officeholders and literati” (xiang dafu
shi 鄉大夫士), made it a collective ritual exclusively for the local gentry and a public
demonstration of their social distinctiveness (Lee, 171). The gentry also claimed for themselves
the role of mediators between local society and government, presenting themselves as
spokesmen for local interests and advisers on local policies. Government schools, which earlier
reformers like Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021–86) had promoted as an instrument of imposing
ideological uniformity and as a training ground for capable officials, were touted in many
Southern Song writings as a venue for local literati to “deliberate on governing” (yizheng 議政)
and offer counsel to local officials (Lee, 163–66). In the Yuan, local literati continued to present
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themselves as “representative voices of local society.” In the panegyrics they composed, Lee
argues, they included subtle exhortations to local officials, “informing them of priorities in local
governance.” (Lee, 254) Therefore, as Lee underscores, the literati’s growing attachment to their
native places by no means implies their separation from the state. Rather, the localization of the
national political elite was, when viewed from the local perspective, also the politicization and
nationalization of the local elite. As new state-certified status markers were introduced into the
local scene, complicating the definition of social positions, gentry families asserted their
distinctiveness and prestige against other members of the local elite precisely in terms of their
connections to the state and their ability to negotiate with it.
The close relationship between the state and the gentry also stands out in Lee’s discussion
of local activism in Southern Song Mingzhou. He argues that although the Southern Song
witnessed an upsurge of communal efforts spearheaded by the local elite, this does not imply a
retreat of the state from local society. Rather, the success of these efforts depended heavily on
the local elite’s cooperation with local government. Not only did the local government, in
general, make a greater contribution than local elites in the development of Mingzhou, but the
financial and administrative support it provided were also indispensable to many local projects
initiated and advocated by local elites. Very few undertakings—including institutions and
practices of central importance to the gentry, such as the renovation of schools and the
performance of the community drinking ceremony—were accomplished without government
support. As Lee aptly puts it, “the rise and spread of local [elite] activism during the Southern
Song period… was undergirded by the activism of local government” (198). Both Lee and
McDermott show that even landed trusts of kinship groups, including the famous one started by
Fan Zhongyan and the charitable estate of the Lous in Mingzhou, had difficulty lasting beyond a
few generations without timely intervention of local government in the Song and Yuan times
(McDermott, 133–39; Lee, 234).
Why so? The answer, I think, has to do with both opportunity and capability. If it was at
all possible to use government funds or someone else’s money to advance one’s own goals, then
why not? The substantial investment that the Mingzhou government made in local projects
during the Southern Song certainly demonstrates the state’s resourcefulness and interest in
sustaining local economic and cultural development, but, from another perspective, it can also be
seen as evidence of the Mingzhou elite’s exceptional ability in swaying government decisions
and channeling government revenues to serve the elite’s agendas. Having office-holding native
sons, as was increasingly the trend after the mid-eleventh century, certainly helped. This is
particularly evident in the construction of the Wujin dike (Wujin qi 烏金碶) that Lee discusses in
great detail. In this case, the local elite of Mingzhou first petitioned Shi Miyuan 史彌遠 (1164–
1233), a native son and then grand councilor, and Shi, in turn, did his job of urging the
prefectural government to take action and cover the bulk of the expenses (Lee, 114–16). With all
these opportunities of using government funds for local purposes, private investment was not
necessary. It became necessary only when the state was unable to bear the full costs or when the
local elite lost its influence over local officials. Thus, it is not difficult to understand why, given
the tighter budgets of county administrations and the dynastic crisis, local elite contributions
were more conspicuous at county levels and especially in the early years of the Southern Song
(Lee 97, 156). Nor is it difficult to understand why, given the literati’s modest political success,
insecure social station, and greater cultural distance from local administrators, local projects in
Yuan-dynasty Mingzhou received far less financial support from the local government (Lee, 207,
232–44).
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The prominent role of Mingzhou government in supporting local development was
evidently also a result of the local elite’s inability to mobilize funds and manpower by itself.
Probably large-scale projects at all times had to depend heavily, even though not exclusively, on
government support. As Wei Xian 魏峴, a retired official and sojourner of Mingzhou who took
an unusual interest in water management, learned from his own experience, “I often contributed
my own money to hire people and dredge the streams, but the resources of private households
can never match those of the government” (Lee, 121 [translation modified]). That said, Lee’s
account of Southern Song Mingzhou portrays a local elite whose heavy reliance on the formal
bureaucratic apparatus in carrying out local projects contrasts markedly with what historians
have long observed in the Ming-Qing period. The reason, I think, has to do with the absence of
social institutions in Song times that the local elite could rely on to mobilize resources in the
community without resorting to the state apparatus.
In the Song, the most resource-rich institutions outside the state seem to have been
Buddhist establishments, which had owned land and forests and engaged in a wide variety of
profit-making activities for centuries. In the early thirteenth century, Mingzhou had a total of 305
Buddhist temples, each owning on average 229 mu of farming land and 293,723 mu of forests.51
Their relationship with the government and the local elite was complicated. Officials and
wealthy local families were sometimes patrons, sometimes predators, and at other times
collaborators. Many local families set up merit cloisters or private chapels funded with land or
just rents to look after their ancestral graves and provide seasonal offerings; others registered
their land under the nominal ownership of monasteries to evade taxes and labor service charges.
It was not uncommon, however, for the very powerful to simply seize a temple and its property
by force and then have it designated as their grave temple. Many literati associated with monks
and studied at monasteries, and the Song government typically used temple grounds to host civil
service examinations. These temples played an active role in local development throughout the
Song, building and maintaining bridges, roads, dikes, and floodgates, sometimes all on their
own, while at other times in collaboration with the local government and the local elite.52 At the
very least, Buddhist establishments were clearly the only corporate entities that had their own
fiscal autonomy and acted independently in the local community. Their resources—even lands
donated to private chapels—were, at least on paper, beyond the reach of the local elite. After all,
the purpose of setting up these grave chapels was precisely to set aside a portion of the family
fortune for the long-term upkeep of ancestral graves and sacrifices, entrusting its management to
the monks, and thus protecting it from unworthy descendants.
In the absence of effective means for pooling resources and coordinating action, it is not
surprising that the local elite in Southern Song Mingzhou would rely heavily on the
organizational capacity provided by local government, especially in projects that required routine
maintenance. To ensure regular dredging of Dongqian Lake (Dongqian hu 東錢湖) and the
Tuoshan Dam (Tuoshan yan 它山堰), for example, the government of Mingzhou not only
established landed estates with prefectural funds to cover the expenses but also arranged for the
management of these estates. In the Song, the government typically assigned each rural
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household into one of five grades based on its assets and made each household take turns to
fulfill certain labor service obligations appropriate to its grade, such as tax collection and local
policing. In the above cases, evidence shows that the same mechanism was employed in
assigning managerial duties over the endowed fields. These duties were either entrusted to
village servicemen, such as the canton leader (xiangzhang 鄉長), or rotated among households in
the top grades (“graded households in nearby cantons with the greatest material resources” [近鄉
等戶物力最高者]; “upper households in the canton” [鄉之上戶]). The only non-governmental
institutions involved in these projects were “nearby Buddhist monasteries” (jinhu siyuan 近湖寺
院), where harvested grain from the endowed fields was stored.53
By comparison, kinship institutions were remarkably weak in the Song and Yuan. As will
be discussed later, collective ancestral rites were practiced by small kinship groups by the
gravesite and lineage halls did not exist. Although references to less institutionalized charitable
action towards kinsmen were abundant, kinship-based charitable estates were few in Song and
Yuan times. Where corporate estates of descent groups existed, they were usually very small in
size, intended mainly to pay for sacrificial expenses, and under the constant danger of being
divided up.54 Even prominent families, like the Shis of Mingzhou, had neither charitable estates
nor corporate sacrificial lands.55 The principal form of rural organization was the village worship
association. Although it gradually took on some nonreligious tasks after the early thirteenth
century, if not earlier, the village worship association remained primarily a ritual organization
until at least the mid-Ming and owned minimal property.56 It is the long-term evolution of these
local institutions, from the Song to the Ming-Qing, that McDermott and Du have focused on in
their studies. It is to the history of these institutions we will turn now.
Village Worship Associations
McDermott and Du have both demonstrated that, in Huizhou and Zezhou alike, villages became
more organized on their own terms in Song times. But they were organized not on the basis of
common descent, but on the basis of common residence and joint participation in the worship of
local gods. Du, in particular, provides a compelling account of the appearance of village worship
associations as a form of communal organization in Northern Song Zezhou and the expansion of
their power in the following centuries. Placing their works within the broader scholarship on
religious and social history suggests several related areas of change. First, social and religious
life in the village acquired an institutional form unknown before Song times. Collective worship
of earth spirits (she 社) had a history going back to antiquity. In the Han dynasty, the
government mandated seasonal sacrifices, also called she, to earth spirits at all levels of
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administration, from commanderies and districts down to administrative villages (li 里). These
sacrifices were organized by officials and village officers. As early as the Han, rural residents
also started organizing mutual-aid societies (dan 僤) and Buddhist worship associations (yiyi 邑
義 or fayi 法義), which had compacts and managers and recruited members on a voluntary
basis.57 These organizations, especially the Buddhist worship societies, flourished after the fall of
the Han and many, by the Tang period, also called themselves she 社 and had become formally
organized.58 In the Song, if not in late Tang, these two aspects of she—as communal sacrifices to
earth spirits and as a form of voluntary organization for mutual aid or collective worship—began
to conflate, leading to the rise of an “inclusive territorial institution” in the countryside based on
ascriptive membership and centered on collective worship which, again called she, were often—
though not always—coextensive with a hamlet or natural village (Du, 8–10, 254–57;
McDermott, 53–58). 59 As a widespread form of village self-organization, these she also
provided the building blocks for multi-village worship communities, which began to emerge in
the Northern Song.
The formation of these multi-village worship communities resulted from momentous
changes in local religious life in Song times. Increasingly each god or spirit was given a distinct
identity with close local ties and thereby transformed into a local tutelary deity. Recent
scholarship has shown that since the late Tang, and especially during the Song, previously
nameless earth spirits who were believed to literally inhabit the soil were now identified as
historical or legendary figures in local history. They “shed the violent, morally ambivalent
character and grotesque forms” of their older selves and became guardians of local welfare. They
were worshipped not because their angry spirits needed to be appeased, but more because they
responded promptly to a wide range of local needs and demonstrated their efficacy in protecting
the local community.60 In Huizhou during the Song and Yuan, McDermott shows, earth spirits
were increasingly anthropomorphized into historical celebrities with a local connection—such as
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Cheng Lingxi 程靈洗 and Wang Hua 汪華—who usually came from a military background,
founded the village, or at some time protected the village or its general area (56–61). Rain gods
in southern Shanxi, argues Du, underwent a similar transformation. Before the Song, local
people made prayers for rain to nameless dragons near local rivers and lakes, where they
supposedly dwelled (24–25). Come the Song, rain gods were given an identity with local ties,
real or fictitious. In some areas, local people worshiped a historical figure like Cheng Tang 成湯,
the first king of Shang, as a rain god and claimed that it was near a local river where the king had
successfully prayed for rain in history (28–36). Where such local connections were not found,
local ties were invented on the basis of efficacy. The cult of dragons continued, but it was now
believed that the White Dragon on Mt. Yan (Yanshan bailong 崦山白龍) was particularly
efficacious (36–43). In the high tide of imperial promotion of Daoism, the Jade Emperor was
also appropriated as a rain god in Shanxi, but again prayers to him in a particular village was
believed to be more effective than elsewhere (51–52). These anthropomorphic deities were
increasingly adopted by local people as their tutelary gods from the Song onward. These
changes, I think, paved the way for wide-ranging religious networks to emerge between villages.
The greater emphasis on the gods’ role as a guardian of—rather than an threat to—local welfare
and the process of “branding,” which differentiated otherwise nameless gods from each other,
created a market for different gods, each with his or her distinct identity and associated with a
different locale, to compete for patronage with his or her ability to address local needs. Some
deities became superstars and attracted a large following in a wide area. These deities did not
displace the tutelary god of each individual village (Du, 59–61). But they and the places they
were associated with evolved into, to use the words of Richard von Glahn, “focal points for
communal identity and welfare” in a wider geographic area and thereby gave rise to multi-village
worship communities. The village worship association also acquired a new significance: it
became the principal form in which each constituent village participated in the collective
activities of these multi-village communities.61
A related change in the Song religious practices was the growing tendency to shelter
these tutelary gods in a small shrine rather than making offerings to them under a tree, near a
lake or river, or at an open-air altar (Du, 53).62 The building of these shrines seems to have
flourished after the eleventh century, probably reflecting both local economic growth and a more
tolerant religious policy by the Song government.63 Such an activity frequently required
cooperation among several natural villages. In Shanxi, for example, the 1076 construction of a
shrine dedicated to the Jade Emperor in Fucheng 府城 village was sponsored by fifteen village
worship associations within a radius of five kilometers of Fucheng, each headed by a deacon,
elder, registrar, or the like—titles borrowed from Buddhist and government institutions. Once
constructed, the shrine became the corporate property of those villages participating in its
construction, which, in turn, strengthened both the alliance and its basic organizational units, i.e.,
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its constituent village worship associations. In many cases, it created a multi-village alliance
centered on the shrine that basically survived into the eighteenth century (Du, 56–59). Likewise,
the construction of White Dragon Shrine on Mt. Yan also involved several villages. After a
Yuan-dynasty renovation, it became the corporate property of four participating village worship
associations, forming an alliance that also lasted even until today (Du, 40–42).64
These developments did not take place in the absence of imperial authority. On the one
hand, the Song court served as a powerful source of legitimacy that loomed large in the entire
process. Cheng Tang was a sage-king in the Confucian tradition. The Jade Emperor was a Daoist
deity who received generous patronage from the court (Du, 25–26). Cheng Lingxi and Wang
Hua, while protecting the local community from the rebels, also demonstrated their loyalty to the
dynasty (McDermott, 57–60). The adoption and appropriation of these religious symbols for
local purposes, therefore, also reaffirmed the authority of the state in the cultural and religious
realms. The court’s bestowal of noble titles was also valued as an explicit form of legitimation,
especially for followers of those deities who lacked historical ties to the dynasty and its cultural
traditions. The strenuous effort of local people to prove that the White Dragon on Mt. Yan had
actually received enfeoffment from the Tang and Song court underscores its importance (Du, 38–
39).
On the other hand, the village worship organization’s organizational capacity for
mobilizing local resources and coordinating communal activities made it the government’s chief
target for cooptation after the thirteenth century. In 1206, the Jin made the village worship
association the basic unit of its rural administration, requiring its head to assist the village head
in registering the local population, collecting taxes, maintaining order, and promoting
agriculture. In the Yuan, its duties were further extended to the running of a village school and
its shrine received generous patronage from local officials (McDermott, 64; Du, 70–71). The
early Ming government continued to have the village worship association function as the basic
unit of its rural administrative structure, but it also made more aggressive moves to bring its
ritual practices into line with canonical requirements. Then in the early sixteenth century it
further attempted to have some Huizhou village worship associations take on new tasks of rural
governance, such as running village granaries and providing moral-instruction lectures
(McDermott, 180–81; Du, 200-216, 257). Although these early and mid-Ming government
efforts had limited success, these policies attest to the village worship association’s ubiquitous
presence in the countryside and the state’s growing interest in coopting this rural institution and
prescribing and regulating its functions.
In sum, the Song witnessed the beginning of rural residents organizing themselves based
on common residence and shared religious symbols. Village worship associations (she) began to
develop when collective worship or mutual aid societies (she), previously based on voluntary
subscriptions, acquired an ascriptive and territorial dimension and came to define the community
of a village or hamlet which participated in seasonal sacrifices (the she sacrifices) to the same
local deity. These village-wide associations seems to have developed greater organizational
capacity from the eleventh century onward, because the rise of supra-village tutelary gods and
the growing trend of worshipping them in shrines, rather than in the open air, required the
participating villages to marshal local resources for the construction of shrines and to coordinate
their religious activities. The tutelary god and the supra-village shrine where he or she was
sheltered, then, also served as a binding force, both spiritual and economic, for an enduring
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alliance among the component village worship associations. As such, these village worship
associations and multi-village alliances that were built on top of them, as an organizational
framework for local life in Song times, evolved primarily as a result of local, rather than
imperial, forces. They also enjoyed remarkable independence from the gentry, who, after all, had
not yet become a recognizable social stratum in Shanxi and many other areas at the time. This
arguably made their heads and managers another type of local elite—as opposed to the gentry—
whose power was rooted in local institutions rather than in official titles or degrees conferred by
the state.
But the Song was only the beginning. From the Song to the first half of the Ming, the
village worship associations seem to have controlled little, if any, corporate property besides
their communal shrines, which, in turn, seems to have limited their sphere of activity largely to
local religious affairs, despite the government’s repeated attempts to have them perform some
duties of rural governance. It was only after the mid-sixteenth century that the village worship
association embarked on a sustained expansion in its resources, responsibilities, and coercive
power and gradually evolved into a property-holding, self-governing body in the countryside.
In Zezhou, Du contends, some associations began to own corporate property and engage
in moneylending by the mid-sixteenth century (226). No later than the late Ming, the village
worship association began to expand its sphere of activity beyond religious affairs and claimed
the power to police its members. In 1651, after a large-scale renovation of its local shrine
dedicated to Cheng Tang, the worship association of Guoyu 郭峪 market town in Zezhou set up
two landed estates, tightened regulations on the use of its collective property, and threatened to
enforce them with regular policing. Three years later, it assumed responsibility for the upkeep of
the town’s defensive wall and its attached living spaces. Through “public discussion of the entire
association” (heshe gongyi 闔社公議), it publicized a set of rules regulating the use and
management of these structures, asserted its power to collect rents and impose fines, and
declared these revenues its corporate property. This provided a stable source of income to cover
the association’s routine operating expenses (137–40). The authority of village worship
associations underwent an even more dramatic expansion in the mid-Qing. In the mid-eighteenth
century, many village worship associations no longer relied merely on voluntary donations to
finance public projects but instead imposed levies directly on their members based on the
acreage of their landholdings. Thenceforth, “shares in the association” (shefen 社分) came to
denote a bundle of rights and obligations associated with landownership and was transferred
during land transactions. After the mid-Qing, village worship associations regularly claimed
authority in a wide range of activities in local life, including farming, sericulture, mining,
lumbering, gambling, begging, funerals, and proper family conduct. They elaborated their
procedures of assembly and deliberation and, asserting supremacy over competing channels of
village authority, issued rules on how the government’s village officers should be selected. In
what may be considered a confirmation of the self-governing powers the village worship
association had acquired in Zezhou, the Qing government, from the late eighteenth century on,
gradually abandoned the lijia 里甲 system and turned to village worship associations for
carrying out many of its tasks (215–30).
Lineage Organizations
In Huizhou, by contrast, the village worship association’s institutional dominance ended in the
mid-Ming because of the rise of the corporate lineage. Some of the core ideas and practices of
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the corporate lineage apparently had an origin in Song times, just like the village worship
association, but the development of the corporate lineage followed a very different path.
If the formation of the village worship association was driven, above all, by religious
faith and the efforts of the commoners, the evolution of kinship institutions in the Song dynasty
was promoted mainly by the gentry and motivated primarily by social and economic concerns: “a
fear of the disaster of inequality” within the descent group and the persistent pressure of
downward mobility resulting from the privatization of land after the mid-eighth century and the
age-old practice of equitable partible inheritance (McDermott, 109, 149). The solution was to
establish some form of shared property within a large kinship group beyond the household level.
McDermott compares two distinct models of managing shared property and organizing large
kinship groups, shaped both by the perennial dilemma between limited resources and growing
membership and by new economic and social conditions from the Song period. The dominant
type of large kinship organization until the eleventh century had been the large communal family
(yihu 義戶), which required all its members to have proximate—if not shared—residence and
that their “dining, education, and other social activities were to be communal and tightly
regulated.” It was, therefore, “a self-contained community,” which required its members to
completely “surrender their private property and much of their social autonomy to rule by a
senior figure,” and in return promised physical and material security. It also valued economic
equality over productivity and focused on the retention of labor. All these features bespoke its
origin in the wake of the collapse of the Han dynasty and its flourishing in the dying years of the
Tang (117–19). As time progressed, however, sustained peace made physical security less of a
concern; in Song times, civil service and other opportunities required successful members of the
family to be more mobile, and the extension of arable land became more important than the
retention of labor in the increasingly crowded countryside of southeast China. In 1050, Fan
Zhongyan proposed a new approach to the management of shared property in response to these
new social and economic conditions. His proposal was to establish a charitable estate (yizhuang
義莊)—or “lineage trust,” as McDermott terms it—as a separate property-holding unit without
requiring comprehensive control over its beneficiaries’ private wealth, residence, and other
social activities. By separating the corporate property from the private and refocusing its activity
from the retention of labor to the management of a corporate estate, the trust thus provided a
loose and inclusive framework that “limited its members’ claims on the trust’s property” and
simultaneously limited the trust’s claims on its members. Despite their fairly insignificant
number in the Song and Yuan dynasties, McDermott argues that it was the lineage-trust model of
kinship-based shared property management that gradually gained popularity in south China from
the late twelfth century onward (114–15, 118). He shows, for example, that the lure of the large
communal family faded for the Wangs of Wukou and their relations in the mid-twelfth century
and for the Jins of Xiadong in the mid-thirteenth century. The Wangs constituted a large
communal family which had broken up in 1024. In 1158, when a member of an offshoot branch
attempted to strengthen ties within his kinsmen, it was Fan’s model that he decided to follow
(140–58).
With some hindsight, Fan Zhongyan’s model of a land trust is typically viewed as a
precursor to the trust-based lineages of Ming and Qing times. But two important differences are
worth noting. First, Fan’s goal was fairly limited and that of some of his followers even less
grand (146). Their concerns were primarily economic. The mission of Fan’s trust was to provide
“its members with no more than a portion of their food and clothing needs, of their funeral and
wedding costs, and of their other living expenses, and it devolved most decisions about their
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daily life onto their separate branch, segment, or household units” (118). While Fan had offered
these benefits to all his kinsmen, as time progressed, some trusts limited their goal to no more
than ensuring the basic subsistence of their poor members in order to maintain the balance
between membership numbers and resource supplies (146). As McDermott points out, Fan’s
rules allow most members to escape “with no specified obligation other than to be educated and
to attend certain annual performances of ancestral worship, if even that” (120). They expressed
little concern for ritual practices or any other extra-economic ties that could unite the trust’s
members into a tightly organized group. Conversely, Fan’s heirs continued to have Buddhist
monks look after their ancestors’ graves and chapel (122).
In fact, ritual practices central to the development of a trust-based lineage after mid-Ming
continued to be ignored or deemed inappropriate in Song times. Collective ancestral worship in
the Song and Yuan Huizhou and elsewhere was usually performed at the graveside by small
groups of kinsmen, roughly the size of a traditional mourning group (wufu 五服), who visited the
graves of the Prime Ancestor and the four immediately preceding generations at seasonal
occasions (99). Worshipping ancestors in a detached building attracted few officials and was offlimits to ordinary families without official rank. Even Zhu Xi reserved the practice as a privilege
of scholars and officials and, still more or less following canonical requirements, limited the
worship to the Prime Ancestor and a person’s four immediately preceding generations. In
Huizhou, McDermott points out, merely four ancestral halls in the Song and eleven in the Yuan
are recorded (103).
Second, those who were attracted by Fan’s model and established land trusts for their kin
were typically members of the gentry, men who had a Confucian education and often held
office.65 Therefore, the growing popularity of lineage trusts in the Song and Yuan bespoke more
the gentry’s interest in strengthening ties in a large kinship group than a new kinship orientation
in broader segments of society. Gentry families after the eleventh century also showed an interest
in uniting same-surname groups on the basis of a putative First Settler or Prime Ancestor. The
different Li groups in Sichuan, for example, compared their genealogies in the twelfth century
and tried to reconcile conflicting accounts of their ancestral origin in the belief that they actually
were descended from a common ancestor. Since the settlements of these Li groups, however,
were so dispersed geographically—often in different prefectures and sometimes different
circuits—and the effort to unite their genealogies seems to have concerned only literati families,
these moves probably expressed the elite’s desire for networking and were thus quite different
from the widespread Ming trend for same-surname groups to merge into a single organized
lineage.66 Recent scholarship on genealogy-writing and ancestral halls leads to similar
conclusions. Patricia Ebrey and Robert Hymes both trace genealogies of the late imperial style
back to the Southern Song. But they also argue that genealogy writing in the Southern Song and
Yuan was mainly a practice of the literati and officials, who used it to establish social status and
build political alliances as well as to provide practical information on who participated in
graveside ancestral worships and where.67 In Huizhou, a text from no earlier than the Yuan and
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quite possibly the mid-Ming reports that “the poor and the rich or titled in his lineage
participated in separate performances of ancestral worship rites” (McDermott, 106).68 In his case
study of Fujian, Michael Szonyi argues that until mid-Ming ancestral halls were constructed
mainly by the gentry and descendants of prominent officials as a marker of their social status
which set them apart from the rest of local society. They “stress exclusivity not commonality.”69
McDermott’s detailed account of lineage rites and property in the Song and Yuan reveals
how reluctant the gentry was to build a detached building for ancestral worship (100–103) and
how frequently the gentry efforts of setting up a lineage trust failed in just two or three
generations (133–58). The development of trust-based lineages in the Ming, by contrast, was
driven by a different social group and a different constellation of social forces. Since the 1990s, a
community of scholars, known to some as the “South China School” (Huanan xuepai 華南學
派), adopted a distinctive methodology in studying late imperial and modern China, which
combines conventional historical research and fieldwork and draws attention to how written
records were produced and used in the local setting. Focusing primarily on Guangdong and
Fujian, these scholars—Zheng Zhenman, David Faure, and Michael Szonyi in particular—refute
the “trickle down” theory that attributes the widespread growth of lineages in the late imperial
period to the influence of Confucian discourses and elite model of proper behavior. Instead, they
view lineage organization as a result of strategic attempts by local people, including many
commoner families, who appropriated state-sponsored discourses and flexibly interpreted them
to meet their own needs.70 Oftentimes the formation of a lineage began with registering land as a
corporate trust under a single progenitor in order to fulfill and limit the descent group’s shared
military and fiscal obligations to the Ming state or to keep inalienable assets under collective
ownership. Starting from the early sixteenth century, when ancestral halls spread through local
society as a popular place to perform sacrifices, these corporate trusts were welded to these halls,
transforming them into powerful property-holding institutions. These ancestral halls, unlike the
gentry ones of earlier times, were “built not by members of the educated elite alone but by
individuals from a wider spectrum of local elites, including merchants, moneylenders, and large
landowners who did not necessarily hold degrees.” They stressed inclusivity, underwrote the
elite’s local leadership, and served as an “instrument for the social regulation through ritual of
one’s kin.” 71 The rituals performed in these halls also deviated frequently from canonical
requirements and incorporated many preexisting local religious practices.72 In sum, the spread of
lineage institutions in the Ming and Qing—the establishment of lineage trusts and the building of
ancestral halls alike—was shaped mainly by local and non-gentry forces, rather than by the
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visions and deliberate efforts of the educated elite or the state. In Huizhou, as McDermott also
notes, the commoners’ right to build an ancestral hall was recognized only ex post facto by the
court, a generation later (178–79). These findings have complicated the relationship between the
Song kinship practices and the Ming-Qing lineage organizations. Rather than viewing the Song
kinship-based estates and genealogy writing as the direct precursor of Ming-Qing lineage
institutions, they suggest that all the Song provided was a set of ideas and experiments on
kinship-based landed estates which would have never become a reality had they not been
triggered by a confluence of social and political conditions in the Ming.
McDermott’s study of Huizhou supplies plentiful evidence that corroborates this view.
The development of lineage institutions in Huizhou began in the first half of the fifteenth century
not with compiling genealogies or building ancestral halls, but with the founding of landed trusts
modeled on Fan Zhongyan’s charitable estate. These landed trusts were set up by rich and
ambitious local men who often boasted military training or experience but had no office or
degree (8, 235). The Doushan 竇山 trust of the Cheng lineage in Shanhe district, to which
McDermott devotes half of his book, was formally established in the mid-fifteenth century by a
grandson of a retired Ming general. He was a “local boss,” but the basis of his social position
was “not an official degree, title, or post,” but “his local wealth and his family’s military past.”
His decision to establish the trust was evidently prompted by the family’s registration as a
military household (junhu 軍戶), which entailed a permanent obligation to provide military
service to the Ming dynasty (245–47). The construction of ancestral halls did not concern the
Chengs—or the Huizhou families in general—until at least the end of the fifteenth century, when
they began to explore more commercial uses of their collective properties and tried to enforce
stricter observance of ancestral rites (107, 179, 245, 306).
Thus, unlike the village worship association in Zezhou, which began a ritual organization
and acquired corporate property later on, the lineage formed first as a property-holding unit and
then took on ritual activities. But two institutions resembled each other in one way: at a later
stage of their development, they both claimed sanctioning powers and evolved into a form of
self-government in the countryside. For lineages in Huizhou, the opportunity presented itself in
1567 when the Huizhou government decided to have community pacts “set up on the basis of
already existing lineage organizations (zu 族) or subdistrict administrative units (tu 圖),” instead
of village worship associations (McDermott, 196). Lineages and their leaders, as McDermott has
demonstrated in an earlier article, seized this opportunity and used community pacts (xiangyue
鄉約) to bolster their own power. Community pacts have a long history dating back to the Song
dynasty Neo-Confucian scholars Lü Dajun 呂大鈞 (1031–82) and Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200).
“Whereas Lü sought to create a mutual aid organization for village commoners” with his
community pact, McDermott argued, “Zhu was more anxious to stress the central role of scholars
in rural life and emphasized the moral, at least as much as the material, well-being of Chinese
villagers” by inserting much more etiquette and ceremony into his redaction of Lü’s pact. The
community pact received little attention from the Ming court and its officials, at least after the
death of its founding emperor in 1398. But starting from the late fifteenth century, there was a
revived interest among local officials in the community pact as a way of imposing control and
restoring order in the countryside. These officially drafted and promoted community pacts, often
drawing on the ideas of Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529) and Wang Tingxiang 王廷相
(1474–1544), differed from the Song texts by “giving a larger role to the state as initiator and
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implementer of their rules” but had limited success in their implementation. But local officials’
backing of community pacts opened the door for their adoption in the lineages.73
From the mid-sixteenth century on, as McDermott and a modern Chinese scholar have
observed, community pacts were “initiated, enforced, and led by gentry and elders” in many
lineages across South China. The rules of these pacts, in contrast to the officially drafted
versions, were in fact, no different from family rules—referred to variously as cigui 祠規 or jiafa
家法 among other terms—that also began to proliferate. As the title of one such text from
Huizhou—“The Community Pact and Family Rules of Wentang” (Wentang Chenshi xiangyue
jiafa 文堂陳氏鄉約家法)—suggests, they were considered one and the same. These pacts and
rules “stressed filial piety to the lineage and largely ignored the demands of the state.” To
enforce them, lineages set up their own structure of authority, including, for example, positions
of pact heads (yuezheng 約正), pact assistants (yuefu 約副), prosecutors (sisong 司訟), and
pickets (sijiu 司糾).74
With the implementation of these pacts and rules, lineage leaders sought to restrict the
government’s role in lineage affairs. Taxes were discussed in the lineage’s monthly meetings to
ensure that they would be paid on time and not become an excuse for government interference.
They required that all conflicts within the lineage be handled by household heads, pact head, and
deputies, and discouraged their members from filing lawsuits in government courts. They strictly
barred the state from interfering in the lineage’s management of its own human and material
resources, such as late payments of rent, robberies, and general unrest.75 The developments in the
mid-sixteenth century, therefore, transformed the lineage from a trust-based group of shared
economic interests into a tightly organized self-governing body that was capable of exercising a
wide range of sanctioning powers.
One may ask why the Huizhou government turned away from the village worship
association to the lineage as the organizational interface between the state and local residents.
The short answer is that by the mid-sixteenth century, the lineage—not the village worship
association—had become the dominant village institution in Huizhou. This dominance was hard
won. And McDermott has painstakingly reconstructed the lengthy and contentious process
through which the lineage rose to predominance at the expense of its institutional rivals:
Buddhist establishments and village worship associations. As has been discussed, Buddhist
establishments had, for many centuries, owned farmland and forests, engaged in moneylending,
and looked after ancestral graves for local families. Village worship associations that had
developed in the Song times, on the other hand, provided an inclusive form of village
organization based on territorial affiliation and the building blocks for an extensive network
between villages. Situating his study in this wide institutional context, McDermott shows that
over the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, individual village worship associations “had
commonly, though not universally, fallen under the domination of a single lineage,” which
restricted association membership to its own kin and forced out non-kin members. In the
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meantime, lineages also aggressively replaced village worship associations as the building blocks
for multi-village alliances. To do so, the lineage claimed the association’s tutelary deity—for
example, Cheng Lingxi and Wang Hua—as its Prime Ancestor and then seized the community
shrine as a lineage property, despite the Chengs’ and Wangs’ clearly insignificant role in the
earlier history of the cult. In this regard, the widespread anthropomorphization of earth spirits
since the late Tang actually paved way for this mid-Ming development (200–210). Moreover,
from the latter half of the fifteenth century and usually after they had successfully seized power
from the village worship associations, lineages waged protracted battles against local Buddhist
establishments. By the late sixteenth century, many larger Huizhou lineages had successfully
forced the monks to return land grants, ancestral graves, and their surrounding structures to the
descendants of their benefactors, thus transforming chapel lands into lineage trusts. Thus, over
the first two centuries of Ming rule, there was “a sea change in the ranking of village
institutions” (179): lineages replaced village worship associations and Buddhist temples as the
dominant institution in rural Huizhou, descent ties replaced territorial affiliation as the dominant
principle of rural organization, and many of Huizhou’s villages became single-lineage villages
where a single kinship group had achieved organizational dominance. The 1597 decision of the
Huizhou government, therefore, was a recognition of the lineage’s victory after two centuries of
battle.
This trajectory of the lineage’s rise to organizational dominance was not unique to
Huizhou. Local residents in Leizhou 雷州, Guangdong, had worshipped a “thunder ancestor”
(Leizu 雷祖) as the rain god in the Tang. Usually portrayed as a grotesque-looking, beast-like
creature, with horns and wings, the thunder ancestor began to be identified by the early eleventh
century as a certain Chen Wenyu 陳文玉, a putative native of Leizhou who had passed the civil
service examinations and carved out a successful bureaucratic career. No later than the midseventeenth century and, quite possibly, as early as the Wanli reign (1573–1620), the Chens in
the villages near the shrine started claiming themselves descendants of the thunder ancestor,
turned the shrine into their ancestral hall, and managed its attached fields as a lineage trust.
Likewise, in Gaozhou 高州, Guangdong, the Fengs 馮 in Old City village started organizing
their kinsmen into a tighter kinship group in the early seventeenth century and by mid-Qing they
had constructed a story tracing their descent to Lady Xian (Xian furen 冼夫人), focus of a local
cult and wife of a certain Feng Bao 馮寶, and made Lady Xian’s shrine in the Old City village,
as opposed to the Fengs’ ancestral hall, the focus of their seasonal offerings.76
The victory of the lineage over its rivals was never absolute. In Leizhou, another Chen
group in Bangshan 傍山 village lost a lawsuit as late as 1784 when they tried to claim a nearby
shrine dedicated to the thunder ancestor as their ancestral hall and the shrine’s attached fields as
their lineage property. In Gaozhou, over the course of the Qing, Lady Xian’s shrine in the
prefectural seat continued to be maintained and its attached fields owned by a multi-surname
worship organization.77 In some places like Zezhou, corporate lineages never fully developed.
There, as Du’s account makes clear, efforts to bind kin into a more tightly organized group
centered on a free-standing ancestral hall and a landed trust surfaced after the mid-sixteenth
century, but they reflected no more than the ideals of individual gentry figures and received little
support. The lineages those individuals established usually had a weak organizational structure,
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possessed minimal collective property, and rarely survived the death of their founder.
Throughout the Ming-Qing period, ancestral worship in Zezhou was typically performed at the
graveside. Genealogy writing and ritual preparations were placed under the charge of a
“gravesite sacrifice association” (musihui 墓祀會) or an “ancestral worship association”
(zuzonghui 祖宗會). By contrast, it was the village worship association dating from the Song
times that continued to provide an effective means of local organization all the way into the
Qing. Even single-surname villages participated in public affairs in the form of village worship
associations rather than lineages (Du, 192–96).
It is also important to note that even in places like Huizhou and Fujian where lineage
organizations were more developed, shared religious symbols and common worship activities
remained a powerful mechanism of local organization. In Huizhou, even after individual village
worship associations each fell under the domination of a single lineage, the lineage and the
village worship association remained conceptually different and each lineage typically
maintained both an ancestral hall and an association hall (shewu 社屋). Whereas the ancestral
hall was considered the “master of the clan” (jiazhu 家主), the association hall was taken as the
“master of the village” (cunzhu 村主). The religious network among different village worship
associations remained and lineages participated in these alliances through village worship
associations and with the deities they sheltered in their association halls. Supra-village religious
symbols (e.g., those in the Shuanglie Shrine 雙烈廟) and the joint performance of worship rites
continued to create a ritual space jointly participated in by different surname groups living in
different villages, each representing themselves with the tutelary gods it had sheltered in its
association hall. Likewise, in a multi-surname village, common worship of the same tutelary
gods (e.g., those in the Cundi Shrine 準提廟) continued to provide an organizing node for
different descent groups in the village, each of which may have had its own lineage hall and
lineage-sponsored association hall.78 Similarly, on the basis of their extensive fieldwork on the
Putian plains in Fujian, Kenneth Dean and Zheng Zhenman have argued that a “nested hierarchy
of temples” continued to demarcate both village-level and multi-village communities, even
though the organization of religious activities in some single-surname villages was based on
branches of the lineage.79
Thus, from the Song to mid-Qing, local society became increasingly organized around
resource-rich and tightly organized social institutions, first based on territorial affiliation and
shared religious symbols and then also on claims of common ancestry. Over the course of the
Ming and Qing, these institutions evolved into property-holding corporate entities with elaborate
organizational structures and possessing sanctioning powers over their members. These
institutions provided organizational frameworks in local society that competed, intersected, as
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well as collaborated with each other. It is evident—in particular, from our discussion of the
lineage’s phenomenal success in Huizhou and the gentry’s failure to replicate it in Zezhou—that
the rise of these social institutions was driven mainly by local forces, rather than resulting from
government mandate or successful promotion by the educated elite. In contrast to the gentry,
whose privileged local status depended heavily on degrees and official titles awarded by the
state, leaders of these institutions derived their power from the economic and organizational
resources they controlled. These two sources of power and, correspondingly, the two types of
local elites are useful analytical constructs for articulating patterns of change in local society
after the Song dynasty. In reality, however, and especially from the late Ming on, the boundaries
between these two realms were blurred.
The Gentry, Local Institutions, and Local Elite Activism in the Ming and Qing
As lineages and village worship associations evolved into powerful social institutions with
substantial material and organizational resources in the Ming and Qing, they provided the
institutional underpinnings for their leaders to take on a more active role in local society. The
leadership in neither type of these institutions was constituted exclusively by men of gentry
status, but the role of gentry figures in these institutions was always prominent from the Ming
on.
In the weakest form, the gentry participated actively in the affairs of these institutions and
cooperated with them. In the absence of powerful lineage organizations, the village worship
association was an indispensable means of marshalling local resources, organizing public
projects, and promoting community solidarity in late imperial Zezhou. Even gentry leaders who
were troubled by religious festivals dedicated to the local tutelary deity recognized the strength
of the village worship association in these areas. Some gentry families (e.g., the Chens of
Guoyu) did distance themselves from the local worship association, but many others (e.g., the
Zhangs from the same town) participated actively in its affairs and joined the community’s
religious assemblies (hui 會) and festivals (saishe 賽社). Evidence from the mid-seventeenth
century shows that gentry leaders who proposed a local project consulted the leaders of village
worship associations and relied on their financial and organizational resources (Du, 265). The
relationship between the gentry and corporate lineages could be even closer. Gentry families had
long recognized that perpetuating their status and solidifying their local power base were
mutually reinforcing. Kinsmen with gentry status provided political protection for lineage
interests, whereas a lineage with abundant material resources, in turn, could afford superior
educational facilities for their members, increase their odds of success in the examinations and
thereby improve the chance of perpetuating their gentry status.80 As McDermott has pointed out,
from very early on, aspirant members of the Chengs—those in the third branch—pursued a twopronged strategy of “maintaining official representation in government and a consistently strong
leadership at home” (291). They pushed their descendants towards official careers, but chose one
from their ranks, who usually had no degree whatsoever, as the resident manager of the lineage’s
trust (356). Thus, although men holding advanced degrees and offices were usually posted away
from home and rarely involved directly in the management of lineage trusts, their connections
with these trusts were far from inconsequential.
Indeed, the relationship between the gentry and local institutions often went beyond
strategic accommodation and cooperation for mutual benefits. Descent groups that had great
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success in the examinations and government enjoyed a competitive edge that made them more
likely than others to dominate a lineage or village worship association. Their competitive edge
was both demographic and sociopolitical. Du shows, for example, that the Yuans 原, which
claimed the majority of positions in the managerial corps of the Xiaojiao village’s worship
association, not only produced a considerable number of degree holders and high-ranking
officials, but also had a much larger population than other surname groups in the village (164).
McDermott observes a similar phenomenon in his discussion of the Doushan trust of the Shanhe
Chengs. After the death of its founder in 1454, the trust was, in theory, placed under shared
management of its five constituent branches, but in practice almost always dominated by the
lineage’s third branch, which enjoyed consistent success in the civil service examinations and, at
the same time, expanded demographically at a much faster pace than other branches in the
lineage. Examination success, as McDermott puts it, was “virtually essential for the flourishing
of any large lineage and the dominance of any of its branches from the middle of the fifteenth
century onward” (260–61).
From the sixteenth century on, the distinction between local power derived from statecertified status and that from institutional leadership became even more blurry, as men of gentry
status and the leaders of local institutions began to overlap significantly. This development
resulted, in particular, from the growing ranks of men holding lower-ranked degrees, such as
district school and Imperial University studentships. These degrees became easier to obtain after
1537, when the Ming court made some of them available for purchase to all who could afford
them, further deepening the mutual infiltration between the gentry and the local commercial
elite.81 These degrees, which rarely led to examination success at higher levels or official
assignments, were essentially markers of status which not only exempted their holders from
onerous labor service duties but also certified their membership in the local gentry. In the
Doushan trust, for example, the relationship between gentry status and lineage leadership became
all the more intimate—and the third branch’s dominance all the more absolute—after the late
sixteenth century when the Doushan trust fell under the control of the “Culture Group” (siwen 斯
文), which was constituted exclusively by men holding at least—and usually only—lowerranked degrees (McDermott, 356). Although the adoption of an examination degree as a requisite
condition for lineage leadership served the third branch well in its competition with other
branches, arguably it also reflected a general recognition that having degree-holding leaders
representing the lineage would allow for more effective negotiations with the local government.
Likewise, in Zezhou, men with low-ranked degrees, like Licentiate Zhang Duoxue 張多學 in
Guoyu, evinced no interest in a bureaucratic career but instead served as a manager of an
association (sheshou 社首) for many years (Du, 130, 139). Wealthy merchants such as Wang
Chongxin 王重新, who made generous donations to local projects and became an association
manager, purchased low-ranked degrees and urged his sons to study for the examinations (Du,
141–42). Unlike the Doushan trust, however, examination degrees seem never to have been a
requirement for leadership in a village worship association.82
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In some places, the gentry could be far more aggressive. In the mid-Qing Foshan, for
example, gentry leaders established their own corporate institution and expanded its power at the
expense of existing local institutions. In the mid-sixteenth century, the only recognizable
collective body in Foshan was the Eight Tu (batu 八圖), a management structure of town affairs
derived from the old lijia institutions and centered on collective worship of the Northern
Emperor in the Beidi Temple. Not surprisingly, the property of the temple constituted the largest
existing source of wealth for public purposes in the town and was under the control of the Eight
Tu. In the closing years of the Ming, however, the gentry of Foshan began to have a stronger
presence in the town. With donations, they revived a defunct local school in 1624 and erected a
meeting hall (huiguan 會館) for themselves three years later. The establishment of the meeting
hall, later known as Dakui Hall (Dakui tang 大魁堂), signaled the gentry’s independence from
the Beidi Temple, where they had previously held meetings, and began to give the gentry
network the look of a formal organization. The gentry’s relationship to the Beidi Temple came
full circle a century later, when they successfully forced the Eight Tu to relinquish its special
rights to the temple and its attached property and thus relegated it to a purely ritual organization.
A “watershed in town affairs,” as Mary Buckus Rankin calls it, this victory gave the gentry
access to the considerable income of the temple as well as to its symbolic capital. Almost at the
same time, a petition was sent to the magistrate in the names of “all gentry leaders of the town,”
contesting the Huo Lineage’s claims on the property at Foshan’s main wharf. The petition was
resolved, again, in their favor, confirming—if not establishing—that shops and other structures
at the wharf were the town’s collective property. These developments in the mid-eighteenth
century gave the increasingly powerful gentry establishment access to lucrative sources of
revenue for financing community projects they favored, including a charitable school in 1744
and a community granary in 1795, among others. The Dakui Hall became a core institution in
Foshan, providing an organizational structure for gentry leadership, with its own managers, and a
forum for deliberation of town affairs and negotiation between the gentry and local interests. It
also managed public funds, organized public projects, and supervised the operation of the
charitable granary and other local institutions.83
Thus, several centuries of institutional evolution provided the gentry in Ming and Qing
times with enormous tangible and intangible resources that allowed them to take on a more
active role in local society than their Song and Yuan predecessors. These changes stood out most
clearly when one compares privately organized local defense in the Southern Song, late Ming,
and the mid-nineteenth century. In the Southern Song, private militias were few and relied
heavily on the leadership and resources of individual families. In much of Fuzhou, as Robert
Hymes has observed, “no indigenous, effective, permanent, private force emerged” throughout
the Southern Song. The elite’s involvement in local defense was usually sporadic and
provisional, mainly in response to immediate dangers of local disorder, and each militia’s
activity was “strongly localized within [its leader’s] own county or the area around his
residence.” The only enduring militia organization was the “Two Societies of the Dengs and
Fus” (Deng Fu ershe 鄧傅二社) of Jinxi county, which seems to have survived from 1127 at
least to 1261 and, at times, operated in several counties of the prefecture. But, as its name
83

Mary Buckus Rankin, “Managed by the People: Officials, Gentry, and the Foshan Charitable Granary,
1795–1845,” Late Imperial China, 15.2 (1994), 1–52, especially 8–17; David Faure, “What Made Foshan
a Town? The Evolution of Rural-Urban Identities in Ming-Qing China,” Late Imperial China 11.2 (1990),
1–31.
40

suggests, the Two Societies was largely a “cooperative enterprise” of two prominent local
families. It was an association of two militia units organized by the Dengs and Fus respectively,
each of whom built and manned a private fort close to home and disbursed their family’s wealth
to hire militiamen from local families living nearby but usually having different surnames. Both
the overall leadership of the Two Societies and the commandership of each constituent unit were
expected to pass on from father to son within the same family.84 In Mingzhou, too, there was
only one sure case of privately organized local militia in the Southern Song, which was led and
funded by the Li family and seems to have been no more than a provisional response to the
Jurchen invasions (Lee, 88).85
In late Ming Shanxi, worship associations in some market towns began to take on a
prominent role in organizing local defense. The construction of the Guoyu and Diji 砥洎 forts
was a case in point. Although gentry figures reputedly advocated—and even boldly claimed full
credit for—the construction of these forts, the projects were obviously funded and organized by
worship associations in these towns and the forts considered a collective property of the
townspeople (Du, 143–46, 150–52). Admittedly, village or town worship associations did not
always play an active role in late Ming local defense. In much of late Ming Shanxi, local defense
continued to rely on whatever resources individual families could provide, just as in the Southern
Song, and typically protected no more than an individual village or market town with little sign
of higher-level coordination. Even many expensive projects, including the construction of
fortified structures, were funded by the private wealth of individual families and manned by their
retainers (jiading 家丁). Since lineage organizations never developed fully in this area,
sometimes even pooling resources from a larger kinship group beyond the household level was
not feasible.
This contrasted markedly with the mid-nineteenth century when non-governmental local
institutions had evolved into property-holding corporate entities with coercive power and
provided enormous material and organizational support that shored up gentry activism. First, the
proliferation of lineages and village worship associations provided gentry leaders with a ready
means of social organization and mobilization. In the mid-nineteenth century, local defense
systems often grew out of existing lineage and village organizations, often by superposing an
added layer atop these organizations to coordinate activities and pool resources from a vast area.
Near Guangzhou, during the summer of 1841, just after the incident at Sanyuanli 三元里, the
gentry quickly organized a well-ordered militia by constructing a new “community school”
(shexue 社學) which served as a headquarters for twelve or thirteen multi-village alliances in
surrounding market towns, which in turn coordinated a total of more than eighty villages.86
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These villages and multi-village alliances, however, were more than loosely articulated, informal
frameworks of gentry cooperation, as was once surmised. Instead, a recent study of the nearby
East Mountain community suggests that they were more inclusive village or supra-village
associations based on common residence and collective worship, though they may have come
under the domination of powerful gentry lineages by the mid-nineteenth century.87 In Hunan, the
lineage was the basic unit from which militia were raised and organized, and these autonomous
lineage militia forces were then aggregated and placed under the leadership of gentry figures
who were bound by teacher-disciple ties and classmate bonds.88
Second, the rise of various types of corporate institutions also provided gentry figures
with convenient access to a vast body of economic resources, including not only profits from
these institutions’ collective property, but also revenues they could requisition with their private
taxing powers. In a more abstract sense, several centuries of institutional evolution and economic
progress provided the gentry in the mid-nineteenth century with a complicated toolkit of
financial management: the very idea of setting up a corporate organization to manage collective
property and finance local initiatives, the gentry’s experience in managing these organizations
and negotiating with the government on their behalf, and the widely accepted practice for these
organizations to exercise private taxing (tax-farming) powers. It then causes no surprise that
gentry figures moved swiftly in the mid-nineteenth century along these lines. Their typical
course of action in funding local defense was to establish a corporate institution (often in the
name of a literary society [wenshe 文社], public office [gongju 公局], militia bureau [tuanlian ju
團練局], or community school [shexue 社學]) and fund it by setting up trusts and giving it the
power to impose levies. To support the Shunde 順德 militia near Guangzhou, for example, the
gentry immediately set up an Azure Cloud Literary Society (Qingyun wenshe 青雲文社),
through which at least several thousand mu of land was attached, and a militia bureau which not
only recruited militiamen but also collected a tax from the silk spinners.89 As Philip Kuhn has
observed, these special taxes provided a more important source of funding for local militias in
the mid-nineteenth century than personal wealth and lineage-owned resources. The taxing
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authority of these gentry-led institutions became “a buttress of localism” and further augmented
the power of the gentry by deepening their infiltration of the tax process as a whole.90
Conclusion
In an attempt to provide an analytical framework for explaining historical change that takes into
account the temporal characteristics of events, Ronald Aminzade calls on scholars to “reject the
notion of a single master process” and conceive long-term historical change in terms of
“intersecting trajectories with independent temporalities.” He defines a trajectory as “a
cumulative, rather than repetitive, sequence of linked events, suggesting a certain directionality
to change.” The intersection of multiple trajectories, he argues, “produces key moments, or
conjunctures that mark the coming together of relatively autonomous processes” and may lead to
substantial structural change.91
The five books reviewed in this essay reveal that the Song marked the beginning of a
major transition in history. Two trajectories, or paths, of change date back, in one way or
another, to the Song dynasty. One trajectory concerns the transformation of China’s social and
political elite. In the ninth century, Tackett demonstrates, political power was monopolized by a
capital elite, while men living in the provinces had little chance of obtaining official rank, much
less rising to political prominence. More men from the provinces entered civil service following
the founding of the Song, but the close relationship between capital residence and political
success continued to a significant degree into the mid-eleventh century, providing strong
incentives for officeholders to abandon their ancestral homes, move their families to the capital
(or a place with easy access to it), and replicate the behavior of the Tang capital elite. From the
mid-eleventh century onward, however, a combination of social, economic, and institutional
factors significantly weakened the privileged position of the capital and offered more political
opportunities to men in the provinces. As political success became increasingly detached from
capital connections, the capital elite dispersed, and the new political elite was constituted by
office-holding families who continued to live in their native places after gaining official rank.
These families built extensive social networks at home with their social and political equals,
which helped advance their careers in government and consolidate their local power at the same
time. These office-holding families and many others who received the same classical education
but had not yet broken into the circle of officials formed a new type of elite in local society—the
gentry—whose claims of higher social standing rested on their close ties to the state and a
national literati culture. Thus, from the mid-eleventh century onward, the political elite was
transformed from a capital-centered group into a locally embedded group. Accordingly, the local
elite was differentiated into a group who had state-awarded markers of status, such as
examination degrees and official titles, and those who did not.
The other trajectory of change is the rise of local institutions, which, over time, provided
the organizational framework of the countryside. The strength of these institutions derived from
the corporate property, formal structure, and sanctioning powers they acquired over several
centuries of evolution. But they all originated from ideas and practices that first gained
popularity in Song times. Village worship associations acquired greater organizational capacity
apparently because of the growth of supra-village tutelary gods in the Song dynasty and the new
practice of worshipping them in shrines, rather than in the open air, which gave rise to the need
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for villages to marshal local resources and coordinate their activities for collective worship.
Lineage organizations also began with the idea of establishing a kinship-based trust, conceived
initially by the eleventh-century scholar-official Fan Zhongyan. This idea offered an alternative
approach to managing collective property and organizing a kinship group, which was
increasingly favored by the gentry during the Song and Yuan over the establishment of large
communal families. It became a practical model and a source of legitimacy for lineage trusts that
mushroomed from the fifteenth century onward.
The concept of trajectory, with its emphasis on the sequential order of linked events,
asserts the causal power of temporal connections among events and explains a particular
outcome in terms of cumulative change in a long-term process. Not all choices and events in the
sequence, however, are of equal import. Key choices at a given historical moment, such as those
in the Song, shape subsequent paths of development by enabling, empowering, as well as
constraining future options. This causal relationship among temporally connected events ensures
a marked degree of continuity in the midst of change, as change unfolds in a long-term historical
process. And for this reason, continuity never implies stagnation and is never established through
sheer cultural or social inertia. At every moment in the process, continuity requires social action
that reaffirms, reinforces, and even amplifies past choices. On the one hand, the rise of the gentry
owed as much to the favorable policies of the Song as to those of later dynasties. Throughout the
Song, the gentry had a limited geographical presence and existed only in a few affluent areas,
mainly the Zhejiang-Fujian coast and the Chengdu basin. As Iiyama argues, they did not become
a recognizable social stratum in much of North China until political division following the
Jurchen conquest protected northerners from their well-endowed southern competitors. After the
mid-fifteenth century, the gentry became a widespread social stratum across the empire, owing
much to the regional quota system the Ming and Qing dynasties designed. On the other hand, the
rise of local institutions arguably owed even more to developments over the course of the Ming
and early Qing. As McDermott and Du have both shown, only after the sixteenth century did
these local institutions develop into full-bodied self-governing entities. First, extra-economic ties
developed in large kinship groups which had previously been bound primarily by their shared
ownership in the lineage trusts, thereby transforming them into more tightly organized groups.
The ancestral hall, which proliferated in the sixteenth century, was more than a site of collective
ancestral worship. It served as the organizational backbone of the more tightly organized lineage,
exercising not only ownership of the lineage’s collective property but also supervision over its
kinsfolk. Over the sixteenth century, the ancestral hall promulgated detailed and extensive codes
of conduct for the kinsfolk and developed an elaborate structure of self-government with
tremendous coercive powers. The lineage also reinforced the ritualistic elements in its group
activities, including ancestral and communal sacrifices as well as regular lecturing on moral
injunctions.92 Second, the village worship association landed in the same place from the opposite
direction. Originating as a ritual organization, many village worship associations—at least those
in southern Shanxi—began to evolve into a property-holding entity with more extensive
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responsibilities in the local community after the mid-sixteenth century. They developed a more
elaborate organizational structure and assumed broad sanctioning powers. By the mid-eighteenth
century, some associations grew fully into a form of village self-government, capable of
imposing levies on the land of their members.
These two trajectories of change created two distinct sources of authority after Song
times: one derived from state-awarded status markers and the attendant social networks, and the
other from the domination of institutions which controlled economic and political resources in
local society. Over the course of the Ming, and especially after the mid-sixteenth century, these
two trajectories intersected and these two sources of authority overlapped significantly, leading
to the spread of self-governing bodies—under gentry leadership or influence—that profoundly
transformed the relationship between the state and local society. On the one hand, descent groups
that enjoyed success in the examinations and produced officials expanded demographically and
accrued more social and political prestige than others. They had a better chance to dominate the
leadership of a lineage or village worship association or, at the very least, win the cooperation of
these institutions. More aggressive members of the gentry created their own organization and
funded it by seizing the resources of existing local institutions. On the other hand, with lowranked degrees increasingly available for purchase after the sixteenth century, leaders of a
lineage or village worship association not infrequently took advantage of this opportunity to
attain more fiscal and legal privileges for themselves and further elevate their social status. By
the mid-Qing at the latest, the gentry’s combination of their state-awarded status, expansive
social networks, and institutional resources under their command made them an ever more
powerful group than their Southern Song predecessors, allowing them to engage more actively in
local affairs than ever.
Clearly, this type of local gentry activism was not separate from the state. Not only did
the gentry frequently cooperate with the state in undertaking local projects, but their expansive
social networks and their ability to dominate local institutions derived, in the first place, from
their privileged local status associated with their degrees and official rank. Moreover, these
institutions were more than an organizational framework. As Prasenjit Duara has observed, they
“acquired their special legitimating aura [precisely] because the imperial order—the state and
orthodoxy—was symbolically represented in them.”93 Lineages derived their legitimacy from the
Confucian ideology of ancestral worship and descent group solidarity. Village worship
associations appropriated, as their religious symbols, cultural heroes in the Confucian tradition
(Cheng Tang), deities patronized by the state (Jade Emperor), and gods associated with dynastic
loyalty (Cheng Lingxi), and actively sought explicit imperial endorsement. Yet both lineages and
village worship associations flexibly interpreted canonical requirements and religious meanings
of their religious symbols to meet local interests. If the rise of these local institutions may be
seen, symbolically and organizationally, as a manifestation of “the integration of local society
into the state,” this integration was achieved – as is evident in the contours of lineage
development more than anything else—only by finding a way to accommodate various interests
in both cultural expressions and organizational forms.94
We are left with one more question. If continuity, or a certain directionality of change,
was achieved through subsequent choices made at different moments of the process, what
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mechanisms ensured that post-Song actors made choices that, to use the words of Aminzade,
“sustain[ed] movement along the chosen path and prevent[ed] reversal or subsequent shifts to
alternative possible branchings.”95 Granted, not all political and social actors after the Song
always stayed on the chosen path. The Mongols, for example, decided against using the civil
service examinations as the primary route of recruitment. Yet, as Iiyama argues, this decision
had limited impact on later history and the mid-fifteenth century witnessed a return to the Song
policies (430–32). Those choices that had lasting consequences, however, were remarkably
consistent in that they all contributed to the expansion of political participation, the growth of a
locally rooted, educated elite with connections to the state, and the spread of self-governing local
institutions.
This may have had to do with the overall social and political milieu in late imperial times,
which defined cultural preferences and conferred legitimacy on a given range of decisions. More
importantly, I think, these choices were consistent because they were in response to the same
long-term structural changes—above all, the growth of commercial wealth—and they worked
precisely because they capitalized on opportunities provided by these long-term structural
changes. First, economic progress, especially the growth of commercial wealth, shored up both
the emergence of gentry and the spread of local institutions from the Song dynasty onward.
Southern economic progress created the danger of political fragmentation and prompted the Song
dynasty to enlarge the scope of political participation, but it also allowed for steady investment in
education that continued to sustain the expansion of the educated elite in the following centuries.
Second, the marked growth of local institutions had an even more intimate relationship with the
growth of commercial wealth. As Michael Szonyi aptly puts it, “commercial prosperity vastly
increased the material resources of members of other types of rural elites, who used them to
behave in a manner befitting the educated elite in the hopes of narrowing the social distance
between them but with the unanticipated result that, in terms of leadership and organization,
[ancestral] halls increasingly reflected the input and interests of those whose claim to elite status
was based purely on wealth.”96 These ancestral halls, in turn, played a critical role in the
“accumulation and distribution of investment capital in the Huizhou countryside.” The lineage
institution, Joseph McDermott argues, “served as a credit association.” Using “these halls’
construction budgets, maintenance costs, membership fees, and spirit tablets’ admission charges
to accumulate considerable funds that their managers could proceed to lend out cheaply to
lineage members or more expensively to non-lineage members,” the lineage institution “provided
financial backing not only to commercial and financial partnerships in Huizhou villages but also
to smaller Huizhou merchants’ expansion into the markets and pawnshop operations in the lower
Yangzi delta.” The lineage’s engagement in commerce was of vital importance, since it helped
the lineage alleviate—if not completely resolve—the perennial tension between its growing
membership and limited collective resources. The profits that these ancestral halls accrued from
these commercial activities, McDermott continues, “helped to pay for the ancestral worship
rituals that lineage elders practiced in part to please their ancestors and in part to retain the
loyalty of fellow lineage members, on whose donations, admission charges, usage fees, and
interest payments they heavily depended” (6, 432).97 This symbiotic relationship between local
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institutions and commerce was not unique to Huizhou or to lineage organizations. Everywhere
from Guangdong to Shanxi and from village worship associations to gentry societies, revenues
from moneylending and rental property funded the activities of these institutions. Village
worship associations in southern Shanxi received generous donations from wealthy merchants
and supplemented their income through moneylending and rental businesses (Du, 226–27). The
Dakui Hall, the institutional mainstay of the Foshan gentry, financed its activities with, among
others, rental income from its shops and land in front of the Beidi Temple and around the town’s
main wharf.98 Last but not least, in the increasingly interconnected relationship between local
authority derived from degrees and official rank awarded by the imperial state and that from the
domination of local institutions, wealth provided the last piece in this jigsaw puzzle. As wealthy
local merchants, on the one hand, bolstered their position in lineages and village worship
associations by underwriting a substantial proportion of the expenses, and on the other hand,
purchased degrees for themselves and invested in the education of their descendants for the
examinations, the boundaries between gentry and non-gentry and between different sources of
prestige and authority became increasingly fluid.
Thus, the new local order—that is, the spread of property-holding, self-governing local
institutions under gentry leadership or influence—emerged out of the mutually constitutive
interplay between social structure and social action that unfolded over several centuries from the
Song to the Ming-Qing. Long-term structural changes from the Song onward, especially
economic expansion and population growth, presented a challenge for effective governance. But
they also provided resources for new forms of local organization and new approaches to local
administration. The growth of commercial wealth and the spread of print culture provided
support for social and political decisions that contributed to the continuous expansion of a locally
rooted, educated elite and the proliferation of self-governing local institutions, which then served
as the organizational interface between the imperial government and its subjects, giving rise to a
new dynamic between state and local society.
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